Examiners’ Report
Principal Examiner Feedback

June 2017

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level in History (WHI04) Paper 1D
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Unit 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

WHI04 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Introduction

June 1706 was the first time that WHI04 was taken by candidates entered for the IAL History qualification, and was the first time that candidates encountered AO3-focused questions relating to Historical Interpretations. It was pleasing to see that most candidates were well prepared in terms of knowledge and that many responses were both well-informed and well-written. However, the approach of some responses to both Section A and Section B limited the ability of candidates to be rewarded at the higher Levels of the mark scheme.

The paper is divided into two sections. Section A contains a compulsory question relating to the historical issue outlined in Key Topic 1 – Historical Interpretations. The question requires candidates to make a judgement on a stated viewpoint, through the analysis of two extracts from historical works which address the historical issue and their own knowledge of the historical issues. The question assesses AO3 skills - candidate ability to analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted - in combination with AO1 skills – candidate ability to demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts.

Section B also targets AO1 skills. Section B provides a choice of essays relating to Key Topics 2-4. Questions set may address more than one topic or relate to a single topic. The essays assess knowledge and understanding of the period in depth – questions may relate to a single event or a longer period – by targeting five possible second order concepts – cause, consequence, change/continuity, similarity/difference and significance. Questions may combine second order concepts, for example, consequence and change. Candidates answer one question from a choice of three. The most common weakness in Section B essays was the lack of a sharp focus on the precise terms of the question and/or the second order concept that was being targeted.

Candidates are, in general, clearly aware of both the structure and the timing of the examination paper; there was little evidence on this paper of candidates having insufficient time to answer questions from Sections A and B.

Candidate performance on each section and individual questions for Paper 2E is considered in the next section. Please note that it is recommended that centres look at a selection of Principal Examiner Reports from across the different routes of the paper to get an an overall sense of examiner feedback, centre approaches and candidate achievement. It is also useful to take note of the indicative content in the mark schemes.

Centres may also wish to refer to the Getting Started guide that is to be found on the IAL History Pearson Edexcel website.
Section A

Unit 4 is the first time that candidates have encountered the AO3 skills requirement and most were aware of the need to address the viewpoint given in the question by analysing the interpretations presented in the extracts and drawing on their own knowledge. The viewpoint stated in the question will be represented clearly within one extract with counter-evidence being presented in the other. However, both extracts may include material which can be both compared as well as contrasted. Higher Level responses came to a judgement about how far they agreed with the viewpoint by analysing both extracts and integrating their own knowledge into the overall discussion. These responses often addressed the extracts from the beginning using them to discuss differing arguments in relation to the viewpoint and deploying own knowledge to expand the discussion and where appropriate indicate other areas of debate not covered. Higher Level responses also met the descriptor requirement to reach a judgement based on the views given in both extracts and did not just refer to the general lines of debate within the overall Key Topic area.

The generic mark scheme clearly indicates the three bullet-pointed strands which are the focus for awarding marks and centres should note their progression:

- interpretation and analysis of extracts
- deployment of knowledge of issues related to the debate
- evaluation of and judgement about the interpretations

Some approaches by candidates matched the descriptors in the lower Levels of the mark scheme. Candidates who wrote a Section B AO1 style answer without any explicit reference to the sources found it difficult to achieve a mark beyond low-Level 2 as all the bullet point descriptors require some engagement with the extracts. Also candidates who wrote responses almost entirely based on comprehension and understanding of the extracts rather than discussing the views presented in the extracts were unlikely to achieve beyond Level 2. Some responses wrote very briefly about each extract and then wrote extensively on aspects not included in the extracts. Again these responses were not using the extracts to develop the debate and so could at best reach low Level 3. A few candidates seemed to have a prepared response to a generalised debate with regard to the Key Topic which ignored the viewpoint given in the question altogether and so were not able to focus on the question set.

Some candidates viewed this as an AO2 source analysis and evaluated the extracts with regard to aspects of provenance which is not an appropriate approach. There may be some occasions when the title of the book from which the extract is taken furthers the discussion of the viewpoint but it is not intended that the candidates use the information provided to help forward the debate and no instruction is given with regard to this (unlike the AO2 requirements). Candidates should be encouraged to refer to the extracts and to discuss the interpretations to be found within the extracts. Here it is worth noting the guidance given in the Getting Started document. Students are not expected to be familiar with the writing of the selected historians but they should be familiar
with the issues that make the question controversial. Reference to the works of name historians, other than the material in the extracts provided is not expected but students may consider historians’ viewpoints in framing their arguments.

Also many candidates appeared to create their discussion by reference to only the first few lines of each extract and so lost an opportunity to develop key points made later in the extracts. Candidates have sufficient time to consider the extracts carefully and to draw out a variety of different key points in order to compare and contrast the interpretations presented.

Overall, candidates for this Option were very well prepared and there were some interesting responses that were a pleasure to read.

Question 1

There were some excellent responses to this question. Most candidates were aware of the need to address the view stated in the question and to analyse the extracts in relation to this statement. The best responses were able to integrate own knowledge with key points raised in the extract and to come to a judgement in which both extracts were acknowledged. These responses also met the requirement to demonstrate understanding of the nature of historical debate. Most candidates were able to contrast the view in Extract 1 that China’s entry into the war was triggered by the US invasion for the north with the view in Extract 2 that China’s entry was as the result of a longer period of consideration timed from the decision of President Truman to send soldiers to Korea in July 1950. Candidates were able to use their own knowledge to discuss this and to develop key points within the extracts. Knowledge of Chinese diplomacy with the USSR during this period was used to good effect.

This is an example of a Level 5 response engaging with the extracts with an awareness of nature of historical debate.

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The justification for China's entry into the Korean War is constantly disputed. Some schools of thought view China's entry as a direct result of pressure from the United States to change its stance on the war, thus drawing China into the conflict for reasons of self-defense and loyalty.

Alternatively, Frank's interpretation attributes to China's already preparedness for conflict, possibly involving US troops in Korea. Overall, it can be assumed China had multiple reasons for entry, largely owing to self-defense but also pressured from the USSR, North Korea, and domestic affairs in China which were not yet formed a unified Communist nation both in practice and theory. China's entry into Korea was thus not only due to a need to join the war but also to consolidate its already existing presence in the region, triggering a broader conflict.

Frank's interpretation highlights the way China repeatedly warned US of the consequences of the invasion of North Korea.
evident within "induced" plainly. This is justified by the knowledge that Mao repeatedly warned Truman of that if U.S./UN/ROK forces were to be used on the Chinese border they would subsequently be forced to retaliate. This as the interpretation clearly states was a matter of the fear of U.S. imperialism evident within "self-confident aggressor." Simultaneously, Frank notes that China became fearful of U.S. expansion only when U.S. aims began to change from containment to roll back. However, Frank is more convincing in suggesting that China was always prepared evident within "he ordered the PLA to begin troop deployments." This is supported by the evidence that Mao offered Kim troops in early 1950 yet Kim declined. Thus, it is more justified to suggest that the working of the "38th parallel" did not create the need for Chinese involvement, but consolidated it, as a response from an accumulation of factors and American actions.

Another reason to suggest that China's entry into the Korean war was
not "triggered" by U.S. invasion of North Korea, which both sides attribute to
in China's self-defense interests. Brogan highlights that China was afraid they had
to face "Chinese emirates else where", China
who had just waited all year, if not
for their interests to prevent U.S.
activity in China after military momentum that
had carried the U.S.
out of confidence to advance into North Korea
in the first place after the Inchon Landing.

Similarly, Frenkel highlights China's fear of
U.S. "swEEP up to the Chinese border." It is clear that China's fear "triggered" by the
possibility to involve in the war before their entry into North Korea, and the	invasion merely consolidated North Korea's fears, and this gave Mao the
more difficulty gaining consent from the PLO to become involved in the war. What further consolidated the need for self-defense was the rebuahika
of Japan who bordered China's industrial
district of Manchuria. Thus, after
the World War II and the Sino-Japanese War, for China to have overlooked the newly
formed alliance of Japan and U.S.
as not a significant threat would have been highly unlikely. Thus, the crossing of the 38th parallel did not actually "trigger" the entry of the U.S., as Frenk's interpretation implies, but concealed the security necessity of doing so.

Assume China also would have been triggered to enter the Korean War as a part of the loyalty to the government's movement, to repay for the support they received during the Chinese War. Through Brogen seems to overlook Chinese entry as "not simply" a problem of "losing face," it is a vital reason. Frenk's interpretation avoids this by the fact it was one step in a process with much deeper roots, potentially commenting on the great cold war environment. It is known that Mao was greatly influenced by the USSR to send assistance to Korea and the USSR provided both Chinese forces and Korean forces to fight with them. Thus, it must be recognized that once the U.S. entered the war it technically became "internationalized" and thus placed Korea in conflict apart of the great cold war climate in which.
Nsr-68 presented the world to communism and capitalism. Tim, suggestions in Francis's interpretation culminates to "military readiness" in August 1950" and RE firmly supports the idea that in this context, attacks from the West on communism was a threat to the strength of the loss of communism both in Asia and in Europe. Thus, the crossing of the 38th parallel into North Korea did not "trigger" Chinese entry but consolidated the need to protect North Korea as a member of the great "Communist Monolithic Bloc". On behalf of the USSR and the Chinese ideological protection, it can be recognized that the security threats posed by the US also predated the crossing of the 38th parallel and this expansion of US consolidated fears. Although Brogan's interpretation suggests that the US invasion of North Korea was "intolerable" other actions by the US particularly MacArthur demonstrated the necessity to enter the war. This retools back to the "deep roots" which Frank alludes to. After the North Korean crossing of the 38th parallel, Truman responded by sending the 7th Fleet...
to the Taiwan Strait and Macau, both publicly
proposed by Japan. This demonstrated a suggestion
to China, a reversion into the Chinese
civil war and other such. Britain also
continued this way of provocation. This serves
to further give credence to Franklin's interpretation
who attributes to China's military preparedness
which preceded the Crossing of the 38th
peninsula. This, although Brogan's interpretation
suggests that the US advance into Korea
demonstrated potential issues for China,
these were already fears that China was
aware of as the US advance created
"fragile" Chinese entry but consolidated its
neutrality.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that China's
entry into the war was also potentially an
effect of opportunism for the newly formed
Communist state. Brogan's interpretation highlights
the role China thought it could play:
"the moment to assert a Third World War?"
This demonstrates the way China also
seeking to gain prestige by challenging the
armistice. This is a prospect which the 38 crossing
by UN/US/ROK forces opened up but not
something which should have been overlooked.
By this time as well China and USSR were already facing tensions due to the ideological conflict surrounding the interpretation of Marx and the USSR were worried North Korea would turn to them instead of Stalin for communist influence. Moreover, China felt expanding your of WR and turned perhaps saw the Korean WR as a method to unify Korea and some monarchs go as far as to say it allowed Mao to consolidate his oppose regime. This further support Frank's interpretation that China did not overlook the US threat in.

The Korean WR and were only triggered off and advance and fact suggests that the crossing and operation on the Chinese borders gave Mao a justification and reasoning to harvest China on the "World stage" end game prestige as both a protector of communism and a fear of able to halt the US. Subsequently, this is what did happen, the world was impressed by China's ability to halt the US in their attempts at roll back. This, however, interpreted is handled in the sense it does not acknowledge the political climate or cultural motives of the world power of the time. This once again the US invasion of North Korea did not
"tragedy" China's involvement but justified her entry as a part of a great political opportunity to gain prestige and consolidate power.

In conclusion, although Brogan is justified in the respect it acknowledges the evidence which highlights China's supposed unwillingness to enter the war unless North Korea was threatened. However, it fails to recognize the great cold war climate which made Chinese entry inevitable and moreover the opportunity the Korea War provided in this respect. Frank is more convincing in the way he acknowledges Chinese warnings of U.S. actions and the security threats predicted the North Korea invasion. Moreover, Brogan, although not explicitly does suggest it was an accumulation of actions not only one which consolidated China's need to enter the Korean War, Chinese entry into the U.S. was not triggered by the invasion of North Korea, but immediately. In this sense, it confirmed sought threats to need to protect communism and of course demonstrated and opportunity to become itself onto the world stage.
Section B

Most candidates were clearly aware of the requirements for the essay skills assessed in Section B. Most candidates showed progression from the AS units and were well-prepared to write, or to attempt, an analytical rather than a descriptive response. There was little evidence to suggest that the range and depth of essays were affected by the time taken to consider the two extracts in Section A. Many candidates were able to access Levels 3, 4 and 5 but weaker responses either did not provide enough factual support for a depth study essay or deal well with the conceptual focus of the question. Centres are reminded that any of the second order concepts listed in the introduction can be addressed in the essay section and candidates need to be aware that not all questions will refer to causation and that not all responses require a main factor/other factors response. Indeed, a persistent number of candidates attempt to respond to all questions by addressing the relative significance of generic causal factors whether appropriate or not.

The generic mark scheme clearly indicates the four bullet-pointed strands which are the focus for awarding marks and centres should note their progression:

- analysis and exploration of key features and characteristics of the period in relation to the second-order conceptual demands of the question
- selection and deployment of knowledge
- substantiated evaluation and judgement
- organisation and communication of argument

At Level 4 and above there is a requirement for the exploration of key issues by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period and many good responses remained in Level 3 because these relationships were stated rather than explained or because key features were addressed separately e.g. stating that each key feature in turn was the main reason rather than developing a logical argument. It is also important to note that the reference to valid criteria in the third bullet point is not a reference to the different factors/key issues/key features being discussed but to the measurement criteria being used to reach an overall judgement. This is the extent to which students are able to explain and justify their decision to ascribe greater significance to one cause than another, or to judge a development as significant or an action as ineffective etc.
Question 2

There were some excellent responses to this question deploying detailed knowledge of the policies of the two presidents. Some argued that they were indeed very similar in their determination to prevent the spread of communism in South East Asia while others argued that Kennedy ultimately increased the US presence in Vietnam and interfered in domestic policy more overtly. A few candidates just described the policies of the two without analysing similarity and difference. Also a few unfortunately mistook Eisenhower for Kennedy or compared the policies of Kennedy and Johnson. It is very important that candidates have knowledge of both the chronology and specific dates of the American presidential policies.

This is an example of a Level 2 response. It provides some attempt at analysis but mainly describes US policies and is not always accurate or secure. At times it seems to be answering a different question and there is no clear judgement. It attempts to outline some key features of the focus of the question.

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President Eisenhower was the US president from 1953 to 1961. He was in office during the Franco-Vietnam war from 1946 to 1953.

President Kennedy was the US president from 1961 to 1963, before he was assassinated in Houston, Texas.

During this time, the US was helping South Vietnam by sending military aid and food and medicine. The US wanted to prevent the spread of communism from North Vietnam that was led by Ho-Chi Minh.

South Vietnam was under the rule of Nguyen Dinh Diem, an anti-communist nationalist who favored the US. Diem was brought into power by ex-emperor Bao-Dai. Bao-Dai wanted Diem to be in power because he was popular among the citizens and favored the US. Diem was appointed as Prime Minister.
President Eisenhower wanted to stop the flow of communism, so he sent aid to South Vietnam. However, South Vietnam's government was corrupt and constantly asked for US aid. The US had to spend millions of dollars in order to aid South Vietnam. It took 14% of the US GNP to help South Vietnam.

During the France-Vietnam war, the French asked for US aid because they didn't have sufficient troops and resources. The French's economy was devastated after the Second World War, so they depended on Vietnam's exports in order to restore the French economy. This is the main reason why France was unwilling to let Vietnam become an independent state.

North Vietnam sent the NLF to fight against the French. France triggered the war when they sent troops to Vietnam's northern borders, where they tried to stop the flow of weapons entering
North Vietnam. This caused thousands of innocent deaths, which caused the Franco-Vietnam war. The French and US troops were unfit for Vietnam's climate as it was hard to find the enemy.

North Vietnam sent the NLF to fight against the French. The NLF is the National Labour Front, North Vietnam's army. They had the advantage because they were adapted to the environment that was hot and humid and filled with many jungles and mountains.

North Vietnam was receiving aid from China and the USSR. It would be impossible for North Vietnam to win the war without their help. China and the USSR sent armaments and military aid. China allowed the NLF to hide in their southern borders as well.

President Eisenhower's policies were to stop the spread of communism while getting rid of the NLF. The NLF went to South Vietnam to help the
people by giving them food and assistance. This had a major propaganda effect, so it made the majority of South Vietnamese to follow Ho - Chi Minh’s ideals.

President Eisenhower was aware of Diem’s corrupt government but he didn’t do anything because he wanted to stay neutral.

The US wanted to stay neutral but pressure from Europe caused the US to help France.

The US had a conflict of Pro-European factors and Pro-Asian factors. The Pro-European factors wanted the US to help France, while the Pro-Asian factors wanted the US to stay neutral.

The US eventually listened to the Pro-European factors because France was an important ally. France was important because they blocked communism from spreading in Europe.

The US was busy with the USSR because
of the Cold War, so they couldn't lose a valuable ally. Thus, the US helped France and provided aid to Diem.

Even though the US was sending aid to South Vietnam, it wasn't helping South Vietnam. It was because Diem exploited the resources from the US. The aids and resources were distributed among the high top officials, so the villagers didn't receive any benefits.

Even if the villagers received US aids, it wasn't enough to help them. Famine and poverty heavily affected the villagers in South Vietnam. They started to resent Diem's government because they weren't receiving help. They only received very little of the distribution, so they resented Diem's government.

President Kennedy's policies were to withdraw US troops from South Vietnam. The continuation of sending US troops and resources were unpopular in the states, because
It was wasting the citizen's money and resources. They were against Vietnam aid because they were helping a foreign country when they could improve the U.S. President Kennedy was aware of the waste of resources, so he too wanted to withdraw US troops. However, the top officials in the US were against this idea because they were making a profit out of it. There were many officials in Vietnam so they would lose their job if they were to leave Vietnam, thus they didn't like Kennedy's policies.

President Kennedy sent troops to South Vietnam to stop the spread of communism. He even sent aid to the French to help them. President Kennedy was adamant of preventing the flow of communism. So he was reluctant of re-unification. Diem's government didn't want re-unification because they were anti-
Communist, so they preferred the US aid.

Hu-Chi Minh, the leader of North Vietnam wanted to re-unity North Vietnam with South Vietnam but it was impossible during that time due to French influence and South Vietnam's reluctance to re-unification.

So he sent the NLF to South Vietnam to gain intel and help the villagers.

While Eisenhower's policies wanted to maintain neutrality, Kennedy's policies wanted to prevent the flow of communism.

Overall, the two president's policies aren't similar because they sent aid to South Vietnam. They sent troops and resources in order to stop the flow of communism. They also favoured the French over the Vietnamese by providing continuous support to the French.

Their policies didn't benefit either North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
Question 3

Again, there were some excellent and thought-provoking answers to this question. Candidates were generally knowledgeable and analytical in their responses. Some argued that the negative affect on public support was the most significant because of the connection to most of the other consequences while others argued that the most significant consequence was the impact on American policy in Vietnam and/or American military strategy. A few responses merely described or explained the consequences of the given factor without considering ‘other’ consequences. Most candidates were aware of the physical failure of the Tet Offensive but the psychological damage that it did to US involvement in the war. The best responses were able to measure significance by addressing the impact of the Tet Offensive and considering the difference that it made to the various aspects of US involvement.

This is a Level 5 response. It provides a sustained analysis, sufficient knowledge and reaches a justified conclusion supporting the argument made.

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The Tet offensive of 1968 is often cited as being the turning point of the war in Vietnam, rather than a demonstration of why the US could not win. In this case, they had entered. The Tet offensive caused mass casualty, in part due to the media, which highlighted the suffering for the subsequent 6 years of the war. However, the offensive also had a lasting impact, due to its actual impact on military performance as well as the political position of the war up until 1973 when the armistice was agreed. However, in both cases, major consequences, it can be traced back to the public opposition which created the military failure, as well as political desperation, which would then require the idea that the impact on public support was the most significant consequence of the Tet offensive.

Although before the offensive, the US public opinion was largely a 60/40 against/not in 25/75 for withdrawal, opposition to the war was still a minority, and at the vast majority of Americans still supported the war. However, in 1968, the Tet offensive turned all kinds of demonic unrest. A huge reason for this is due to its impact on expectations. Despite most Americans believing they were winning, which made the military humiliating defeat of the Tet offensive all the more damaging. One prominent journalist named Walter Cronkite announced that there was a "view in the hell is going on over there? I thought we were winning the war?" The reaction is increasingly significant as it reflects the shift in the view...
of the media which played a large part in shaping public opinion.

This was significant that it led Johnson to say, "If I've got
Coombs, I've lost America." From 1968 onwards, the opposition to the war
increased massively in scale. For example, in 1971 there were 250,000
taking the size of much of the demonstration, a fourth of which,
were in San Francisco in the spring of 1969, a decade before.

More notably however is from the drop in Johnson approval rating which
fell to under 36%. The significance of Tet is therefore huge, although
the creation of massive public upheaval it could be said that the
media made a victory impossible to the president (Johnson and Nixon).
Nixon's support needed to ensure a victory for the US. However, it
could be argued that Tet did not create opposition, but rather accelerated
its growth. In the years up to Tet, there was increasing public opposition,
which was merely highlighted and achieved by Tet, which came
as an outburst demonstration on the full scale of the US involvement
in Vietnam. However, the change in attitude of the media could also
suggest that the Tet event in fact changed the views of the public,
from a mostly support to a mostly opposed public.

However, it cannot be said that public opposition was the largest consequence
without considering other effects. The Tet offensive arguably demonstrated
to the US and the world that the war was not purely military
force could not be one, and caused a sequence of failed US
collapse, leading to even greater American loss of confidence. During the offensive,
thousands of NVA units moved undetected through US forces and
coordinated an attack on several key points, which although failing to
retake, Vietnam did cause over 5000 deaths as well as one more.
During the war, the US could not effectively fight the enemy or the Vietnamese Communists. The morale on the military was multi-faceted. On one hand, it changed the psychology of the US troops who suffered morale damage at this military defeat. Secondly, however, the battle showed the enemy the feasibility of their intervention as they failed to prevent or effectively defend the attacks. The longer term impact on the Tet was quite significant.

In order to regain the confidence of the public and the army, the US attempted a series of operations to regain advantage, all of which failed. For example, the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail can be seen as a classic attempt to mirror the Viet Cong's style of guerilla warfare. However, all the bombardments failed to have any significant impact, instead causing further devastation of the US depiction to the country. Following the Tet offensive, yet the bombing or harassment provided nothing at all by unnecessarily harming civilians. Overall, Tet had a significant change on the military performance. On one level, it created a morale problem. More than this, it created a kind of military deception as the US tried to gain victory yet achieved nothing. Finally, the offensive showed once more that the Communists could not be defeated, thus creating the frustration in the US or the public war. However, all of the military failure could be argued as being an extension of public opinion. At the offensive, failed, the government was desperate to quell dissent by promising victory, which created another factor. In the logic, it could still be argued that the largest consequence of Tet was how it irreparably altered the perception and attitude of the US public for the rest of the war, which ultimately led to the defeat or armistice.
was eventually signed in January of 1973.

Another significant result of the Tet offensive was how it altered the politics in the war, such as though the new reconciliation for peace. As well as its part, it affected all the problems which arose during the war had endured. Fear, in lesser they required long the first term president to be a war. This fear cast a most important to nation. Following the Tet offensive, the US had finally reached the operating of their continued involvement into the conflict in Vietnam. Most of the US understood that the method of the US army were incompatible with the newly general, torture. At a result of the realization, Nixon resigned his office for peace until honor, which dictated the cessation of the war. In 1971, the US finally entered into negotiations with the North Vietnamese to attempt to have some visible cemeteries. But showed that a military end to the war would favor them was impossible. As a result, the US, under Nixon, to attempt to find a mutually beneficial cemeteries. However, the terms were heavily debated, and they demonstrated the second logo of the logo lasting cemeteries in 1975. Not only did 1975 effectively mark a need for peace talks, it also cleared on urgency and direction on the US negotiators to try and achieve peace as quickly and efficiently as possible. Which resulted in a cease-fire or ceasefire being made in order to set find and agreed upon cemeteries.

That marker they which demands had to conceal the idea
or mutual withdrawal, which was deemed to them, leading to more
demoralization than was not measured even to the extent of allaying
VC troops to remain in south Vietnam even after the US withdrew.
Ultimately, the US were forced to cease all bombing. This power of the
Vietnam during the negotiations can be said to be in the interest of their
overriding need for security, which culminated in the 1973 offensive, which
placed them in a position of relative power. However, the military
significance of Tet on negotiations is somewhat undermined due to
the US and American persistence that the US remain in power which
was eventually agreed upon. However, they were forced to accept
a condition, recognizing the power and authority of the Vietnamese
commander, another major concession. Although Tet did directly
accelerate negotiations due to the diminution of its retaliatory or threat, it
did not necessarily mean that even the necessity or
negotiating was always to have it affected public perception. Following
Tet, the belief that the US should be ended grew, with 49% of
people favoring leaving in 1968. Similarly, Nixon's approval reached
an all time low, further creating a need for an end of the
war if he was to regain any degree of popularity. This would
this rupture the idea that the most significant consequence of the 1968
Tet offensive was how it irreversibly lowered public support for the
war itself.

To conclude, although the Tet offensive can be seen as
a significant turning point in the Vietnam War due to how it affected
several aspects of the war. The offensive instantly lowered the public
This Level 4 response does engage with the question and explore key features but there are limitations which means that it meets the Level 4 rather than the Level 5 descriptors.

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Plan - Tet

- VC guerrillas, public opinion
- SDS movement, black power, counterculture
- Silent majority etc.
- Negative impact militarily but bill ratio
- Negative impact for congressional support, e.g. LBJ
  but this was arguably pre-Tet
  Conclusion paved the way for withdrawal.

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a very negative effect on public support for the war, encouraging support for the anti-war movement (AUMC). However, perhaps its greatest effect was on Congress, personified by LBJ not re-submitting his candidacy for reelection, creating an initial shock which set in place the policy of de-americanization, or withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the first and most significant consequence was growing discontent for the war which was triggered by Tet. The image of VC guerrillas surrounding the US embassy in Saigon was a propaganda triumph for the North Vietnamese forces. This image was to be portrayed nationwide as spurring discussion about the war.
Famously, Wallace Cordonite said "What the hell is going on? I thought we were winning the war!" The impact of the widely respected TV anchorman is emphasized by LBJ’s statement "if we lose Cordonite, we lose America" and the significance of public opinion shown through LBJ’s - "public opinion is the weakest link in our armour." Indeed, public opinion was very pivotal and Tet portrayed increasing discontent. An opinion poll highlighted only 30% had felt there had been no progress made in Vietnam since 1965. In addition, a gallup poll showed 20 per cent had switched to opposing the war. The anti-war sentiment was greatly increased with growing SDS protests (200,000 marched on New York in 1969), and further support for Black Power movement. This negative public support for the war would serve to undermine congressional support too. Hence, with a great deal of the population switching to opposing the war, it is accurate to say the most significant effect of Tet was negative public opinion for the war.

However, on the other hand, one could argue that there was not a great deal of negative support for war as a consequence of Tet. Although 20% switched to opposing the war, they were still the minority (3:1). This would be highlighted by Nixon’s "silent majority" speech in November 1969 which highlighted 67 percent.
still supported the war. Also, public opinion did not impact presidential thinking. An opinion poll accentuated that the AUM was regarded as “more offensive than the war itself.” Therefore, while the Tet offensive did spark greater public backlash to the war, negative public opinion did not heavily impact on presidential thinking and policies. In this way, the negative public effect on public support was a consequence, but not a significant one.

Perhaps what had more of a significant consequence, was the Tet offensive’s effect on US militarily. The Tet exposed the military’s failings greatly - both to congress and the public. Firstly, it portrayed the weakness of US counter-intelligence which had been focusing on the Khe Sanh offensive. Moreover, it emphasised the USA’s weakness to guerrilla tactics. Never although there was considerable success in the war itself – Westmoreland claimed the US proclaimed the favourable 10:1 kill ratio - and mini Tet and Tet III were complete failings - it showed there was much more to winning the war than a single military victory. It highlighted it was a military failing because despite success in battles, the number of VC insurgents was actually growing. This was due to the various bombing runs which negatively impacted South Vietnamese support for the American-sponsored government. Thus, the a significant consequence of Tet was that it
it signified small victories. However, the VI were not enough
to stop its growing support and because the US could not
stop prevent fostering support, the Tet continued this great
problem. Hence a significant consequence of Tet Offensive
was that it eliminated the USA's military failure to stop
VI support.

What I believe to be the most significant off consequence
consequence of the Tet Offensive was its impact on
congressional support for the war. Post-Tet, LBJ significantly
decided to not resubmit his candidacy for re-election.
He simply could not sustain a war's and budget policy-
his Great Society program strained of cash due to the
growing budget deficit as a result of the Tet offensive
(1.6 billion in 1965 - 25.3 billion in 1968 after Tet). It
set in place the initial shock which set in place the
party of de-communization, or gradual withdrawal
from Vietnam. This erosion of support for the war was
felt through all the echelons of US government
and was a leading factor in negative private/political/
congressional support for the war. In this way, the most
significant consequence of the Tet Offensive was not its
effect on public opinion, but its effect on congressional
opinion to the war.

Arguably, however, this erosion of support was occurring
Paper Summary
Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

Section A
- Candidates should use the time available to read and consider both extracts carefully before planning their answer.
• Candidates should read the question carefully and make sure that the address the view specifically stated in the question
• Candidates should aim to interpret both extracts by analysing the issues raised and showing an understanding of the arguments presented by both authors
• Candidates should aim to integrate own knowledge with the key points raised in the extracts.

Section B
• Spending a few minutes planning helps to ensure the second order concept is correctly identified
• Candidates must provide more precise contextual knowledge as evidence. Weaker responses lacked depth and sometimes range
• Candidates should avoid a narrative-descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels
• Candidates need to be aware of key dates as identified in the specification so that they can address the questions with chronological precision
• Candidates should try to explore the links between issues in order to make the structure of the response flow more logically and to enable the integration of analysis.