Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and ONE question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
  - *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets
  - *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
SECTION A

Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

1. How far do you agree with the view that the outbreak of a general European war in August 1914 was unexpected?

   Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

   (25)
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

EITHER

2  How accurate is it to say that international attempts to achieve disarmament, in the years 1921–33, were a complete failure?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

OR

3  How far do you agree that the most significant influence on Hitler’s foreign policy in the years 1933–39 was a desire to overturn the Treaty of Versailles?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)
Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☑. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☑.

Chosen question number:  
- Question 2 ☐  
- Question 3 ☐
Extracts for use with Section A.


Most Europeans naturally and easily went about their daily lives unconcerned about any aftershocks from the assassinations in Sarajevo. Some looked ahead to a possible Austro-Hungarian response and, regardless of nationality, opinions in Europe were broadly similar. Optimism reigned that the Austro-Hungarian response would be cautious and proportionate. On 18 July, the German government announced that the British had extended an invitation to the German Navy to make a friendly visit to England in August. By that point the ‘electric shock of Sarajevo’ had long since passed and the Balkans were no longer news in either Berlin or London.

Newspapers ignored the crisis until the last minute, not because they were naïve regarding international events, but because of lessons learned from recent history. Those lessons learned from recent history gave Europeans all the faith they needed that the assassinations would not lead to war. From 1905 to 1914 Europeans had seen much bigger crises come and go. They assumed that the powerful forces, that had resisted war over the last decade, would interact again to stop this relatively minor Balkan incident from getting out of hand. Three weeks after the archduke’s death, virtually no one in Europe feared that the skies would darken or that the thunder would return.


Europe drifted uncontrollably towards battle through a series of international crises, which after 1905, were increasingly settled by ‘brinkmanship’ – by the threat of war.

From 1905, revolutions caused the destabilisation of the international situation. In 1905, Russian attention was temporarily diverted by revolution. This encouraged Germany to assert her claims in Morocco by intimidating France. Berlin was forced to back down, at the Algeciras conference in 1906, by British support for France. Two years later, revolution in Turkey destroyed the carefully constructed international balance in the always explosive Near East. Austria used the opportunity formally to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus precipitating a crisis with Russia, settled only by threat of military support for Austria by Germany.

In the third great international crisis, in 1911, Germany sent a gunboat to Morocco ready to seize the port of Agadir but was forced to back down by what appeared to be a British threat of war. Whether this was actually intended is irrelevant. The Agadir crisis demonstrated that almost any confrontation between two major powers now brought them to the brink of war.

By 1914 any incident, however random – even the action of an inefficient student terrorist in a forgotten corner of the continent – could lead to such a confrontation, if any single power, locked into the system of bloc and counter-bloc, chose to take it seriously.

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