



Examiners' Report **June 2024**

GCE History 9HI0 1E

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Introduction

Once again it was pleasing to see candidates being able to engage effectively across the range of Levels in the Advanced Level paper 1E, Russia, 1917-91: from Lenin to Yeltsin. Candidates were generally well prepared and centres are to be commended for the wealth of knowledge and the standard of analysis that candidates deploy in their answers to breadth questions. There is also a growing confidence amongst candidates in their analysis of the Interpretation extracts. Many of the responses were interesting and enjoyable to read.

The paper is divided into three sections. Both Sections A and B comprise a choice of essays – one from two in each – that assess understanding of the period in breadth (AO1) by targeting the second order concepts of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance. Section C contains a compulsory question which is based on two given extracts. It assesses analysis and evaluation of historical interpretations in context (AO3).

The majority of candidates organise their time effectively, and once again there were very few examples at all of candidates not answering questions in all three sections. There continued to be, however, a large number of candidates whose handwriting was illegible. Although it is acknowledged that many candidates will not have practised writing in long-hand as much as in the past, candidates need to be aware that legible handwriting is important in communicating their arguments; examiners can only reward marks for the material that they can read.

It is clear that, in the AO1 sections, most candidates have very good knowledge of the specific elements/key features covered in each of the four Key Themes. However, this knowledge is not always being deployed to answer the specific question being asked. Questions can be focused on the Key Themes or on wider aspects of political, economic and social developments over time. Many candidates seemed to identify the Theme that the given factor had been taken from and then just deploy information about other factors in that Theme whether they were relevant to the focus of the question or not. For example, Q1 focused on the consolidation of the Soviet regime and the role of the mass media and propaganda in the process of consolidation (crossing Themes) but many candidates wrote a response that centred more on controlling the people (Theme 3). This led to many responses being rewarded high Level 3-mid Level 4, scoring well on BP2 of the generic mark scheme but not always analysing relevant key features (BP1) or organising a logical, coherent and precise argument (BP4). This issue was exacerbated in some cases where it appeared that candidates were writing 'rehearsed' responses in relation to the specific factors within a Theme rather than responding to the specific question asked. The areas of focus in Section A and B were: Q1 – the consolidation of the Soviet regime; Q2 – the decline of the Soviet economy; Q3 – sustaining the Soviet regime; Q4 – attitudes of the Soviet regimes. Concentrating on the factors rather than the focus of the question means that responses often do not meet 'fully' the conceptual demands of the question and that criteria applied may not be wholly relevant. Writing knowledge about a factor and then stating that this therefore means that Bolshevik power was consolidated or that the Soviet regime was sustained does not analyse the relationship of that key feature/factor to the focus or the relative importance of that key feature/factor to others.

Following on from above, there was also an increased tendency for candidates not to keep to the time periods identified in the questions. Quite often candidates wanted to include detailed knowledge of the Stalin era in questions that at best required a light touch in reference to Stalin. Q1 covered the time period up to 1928 and so only required reference to Stalin in relation to the period of the struggle for power, while Q2 and Q3 could validly refer to Stalin's legacy but did not require a detailed description of Stalin's actions in relation to the economy or the secret police. Also, there were a significant number of candidates who included detailed information about Khrushchev in Q2 responses (covering 1964-85) and did not include Khrushchev in Q3 responses (covering 1953-85).

There were also many responses that achieved Level 4 marks that analysed key features well with sufficient knowledge but were not as secure in their knowledge to 'fully' meet the demands of the question or precise enough in their development of an argument to reach Level 5. This often highlighted misconceptions. For example, references to the cult of the personality in Q1 responses often referred to Lenin's creation of his own personality cult and in Q3 knowledge of Khrushchev's changes to the secret police led to assertions that the secret police had no impact on sustaining the Soviet regime during his period in power at all.

It may be worth looking back at the comments in the 2023 Examiner report about the importance of planning, the differences between chronological and thematic approaches to questions covering the whole time period and the expectations of combining analysis and knowledge in A level responses for Sections A and B.

In Section C, the strongest answers demonstrate a clear focus on the need to engage with the different arguments given within the two extracts recognising that these are historical interpretations. These responses provide a comparative analysis of the merits of the different interpretations offered in relation to the view presented in the question. High-scoring responses explore the validity of the arguments offered by the two historians in light of the evidence, both from within the extracts, and the candidates' own contextual knowledge. The best responses often discuss the extracts in relation to each other rather than separately. Weaker responses often attempt to evaluate the extracts in relation to the quantity of factual evidence provided or present a generalised discussion of the view with little reference to the extracts themselves.

It is clear that most candidates are now aware of the need to build their responses around the extracts and that a discussion of the extracts is required. At Level 3, most candidates outline the arguments in the two extracts with some contextual knowledge in support but often are rewarded at mid-Level 3 because they sum up the views in the extracts rather than attempt to come to a judgement on the view. There are now very few references to 'reconciling' the extracts or lengthy memorised introductions with little real relevance to the view in the question. There did seem to be a slight increase in responses that seemed 'pre-prepared' and tried to fit the extracts into a discussion of the specification bullet points rather than the view specified in the question in relation to the chosen extracts. Also, having noted that last year there were fewer candidates who wrote responses using the extracts as evidence for their own knowledge rather than using their contextual knowledge to validate the extract, there seems to have been a return to this approach from a small but significant number of candidates. A few candidates still attempt AO2 source evaluation in relation to the provenance of the extracts; this is not required and rarely relevant.

The best Section C responses use contextual knowledge not only to expand the information in the extracts but also to expand the discussion around the extracts. Candidates who select contextual knowledge that validates or challenges the specific views and information in the extracts are able to construct an evaluative argument that reach judgements on views given in both extracts (Level 5 – BP3).

Overall, as last year, candidates had good knowledge and understanding of the ongoing development of Russia/the USSR over seventy years of history and had an awareness not only of the approaches of different leaders but the variability of approaches within their periods of government. There continues to be a growing confidence with dealing with the extracts and there were some very interesting essays written in all three Sections.

Please note: It is recommended that centres look at a selection of Principal Examiner Reports from across the different options within 9HI01 and previous series to get an overall sense of examiner feedback, centre approaches and candidate achievement.

Centres may wish to refer to the *Getting Started* guide that is to be found on the Pearson Edexcel GCE History website. Further resources that may be of use are the *Applying Criteria* and *Developing Student's Understanding of Historical Interpretations* documents to be found on the Pearson Edexcel History GCE website. The *Applying Criteria* document gives guidance with regard to the application of criteria for the different AOs tested at A level.

The candidates' performance on individual questions is considered in the next section.

Question 1

This was the more popular of the two Section A questions by far and was generally well done with most candidates having a good knowledge of the role of mass media and propaganda in the consolidation of the Soviet regime to 1928. Please note, it was not expected that both elements would be dealt with to the same extent and many candidates effectively brought them together rather than seeing them as separate. Stronger responses centred securely on the focus of the question, determining the accuracy of the statement that, in the years 1917-28, Bolshevik control of the mass media and propaganda was the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime. Most strong responses were able to consider the relationship of both mass media and propaganda to other factors – such as terror, political manipulation, economic policies – that allowed the Bolsheviks to consolidate their hold on power. Responses that referred to religion and arts and culture separate to propaganda found it more difficult to explain their relationship to the consolidation of power; many of these responses tended to assert a connection. Many of the better responses came to the conclusion that, although control of mass media and propaganda were vital in informing and persuading the people of the advantages of Bolshevik rule, the use of terror, particularly in the period of civil war, was vital to the consolidation of power. There were some excellent answers that suggested that political manipulation throughout the period and the role of pragmatism in the first half decade were more important than mass media and propaganda in the consolidation of the Soviet regime.

Many good responses did not get to the top of Level 4 or into Level 5 because they did not really explore the relationships between the given factor and other factors. Often these responses ignored the given factor until the end and so were not able to explore the relative importance of the mass media and propaganda to the alternate 'main reason' chosen, usually terror. These responses often ran out of time to discuss mass media and propaganda adequately. It was often difficult to tell what the original question was from reading the introduction and/or conclusion because the given factor was dismissed or briefly mentioned. Better responses take the given factor and explore its relationship to the other factors rather than candidates working their way through a list of different factors that might contribute and asserting that each one is the main reason.

Weaker responses tended to rely on generalised statements about the use of mass media and propaganda and the use of terror, often referring to control of the radio or the use of the secret police in general terms that could apply to any of the periods of rule in the USSR. Many candidates who wrote about the cult of the personality were not clear about its development and saw this as an element more important in the early period rather than being more relevant to the consolidation of power in the years after Lenin's death. Even at Level 4, some candidates asserted that Lenin created his own personality cult rather than an understanding of the Communist Party's use of Lenin's persona and meant candidates missed an opportunity to take their response clearly into the period 1924-28 with Stalin's development of the cult. Many weaker responses provided descriptions of the Bolshevik control of the television but this was a common misconception that was often briefly referred to even in better responses.

This is a Level 4 response.

When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they inherited a capitalist, Tsarist society, therefore they had to consolidate the Soviet regime before there was too much opposition. To do this they used terror, mass media control of government and the legal system, and propaganda and ~~control of culture and the arts~~. These were all important in the creation of a new regime however without the use of terror and the role of the civil war, the regime may not have been consolidated as fast or as easily. Consolidation can be interpreted in a number of ways however in ^{this context,} ~~the Soviet regime~~ it means the creation of a centralised, bureaucratic state and minimal, if not no, opposition to the regime.

When Lenin came to power he was very quick to utilise different media forms to try and consolidate power. He immediately banned all non communist newspapers and made them cheap and easily available to ensure high readership. These newspapers were then used to spread his propaganda to try and get people to become communist and join the party. It was not just newspapers that were used as due to the low literacy rates (at about 55% in 1917) a lot of people could not read. Therefore radios were utilised almost immediately, speakers were placed all around Moscow and by 1922 it had a well developed broadcasting system. Everything played or published had to go through the party and you were more likely to hear propaganda on the radio than music. The aim of this mass media and propaganda was to try and indoctrinate people to join the party and remove opposition.

in a more peaceful means, without the use of force, therefore consolidating the Bolshevik's power, however there were still uprisings like the Kronstadt mutiny and Tambov Uprising which had to be put down. Therefore mass media and propaganda were used to consolidate the Soviet regime and it can be argued that terror was more influential and therefore the 'main' reason.

The Cheka was established in 1917 and it was used to root out opposition, it used arrests and surveillance to do this. Opposition to the Bolsheviks was strong in 1917 and 1918, with some other left wing parties being more popular, for example when Lenin called the Constituent Assembly and the Socialist revolutionaries got 410 seats as opposed to Lenin's 175. Therefore their removal was needed, as soon as the SRs and the Mensheviks were banned, over 5000 Mensheviks were killed or arrested so that they could no longer pose a threat to the Soviet regime. The Cheka were also used to remove religious opposition (over 1000 priests were killed in the civil war) and 4/5 of village churches destroyed, although this was not as effective as the removal of other parties to create a one party state, as in the 1920s, 55% of peasants were still a practicing Christian. ~~However~~ the A turning point in the consolidation of the Soviet regime was the civil war. In this terror became normalised and the powers of the Cheka grew hugely, this combined with the ~~the~~ red terror removed most of the potential opponents to Lenin's consolidation of power and by the end of it ^{the} Bolshevik regime had been secured. The Cheka acted above the law and this continued all the way until 1954 when Khrushchev reduced its power. However, it is

important to note that although highly influential in consolidating the Soviet regime the cheka (renamed the OGPU in 1921) never acted on the party in the period 1917-28 and would not have been as effective if there had been more opposition, as membership did not start to grow substantially until the mid to late 1920s. Therefore it could be argued that propaganda did enough to minimise opposition so that it could be dealt with by the secret police.

Lastly, without the consolidation of government by Lenin from the inside it would have been a lot harder for the secret police to remove all the opposition, ~~and the fact the~~ Lenin's use of the legal system and government was very effective in consolidating the regime. His use of the law to ban all non-socialist newspapers was very important in minimising the voice of potential opposition and making it harder for them to gain support. Furthermore his removal of checks and balances allowed the party structure to ~~expand~~ really increase its power and to start to rule by decree, with no limits. His manipulation of the legal system can be seen again when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly and made the organs of crisis instead (in which Bolsheviks had more power) after seeing the potential opposition from the SRs after the vote. However, the impact of the civil war cannot be understated. The civil war aided greatly in the development of a highly centralised, bureaucratic, one party state, which after the war had ~~also~~ consolidated the power of the Soviet regime easily. This was aided by the removal of ~~any~~ potential opposition by the OGPU and the indoctrination of the

people through mass propaganda, however the civil war really enabled the Soviet regime to be consolidated and integrated ~~before~~ after the defeat of the whites.

In conclusion, the main reason for the consolidation of the Soviet regime in 1917-28 was the use of the secret police to remove opposition and the impact of the civil war. However the control of government and the use of mass media and propaganda were a crucial in minimising opposition that needed to be removed and increasing the power of the Bolshevik party so that it could consolidate its new Soviet regime.



The response clearly focuses on factors that were significant in the the consolidation of the Soviet regime. It develops mass media and propaganda, terror and the consolidation of the political system and does attempt to weigh the role of the mass media and propaganda in relation to the use of terror, which it sees as being more important. However, it is not wholly clear from the organisation of the response as what to which factor is the given factor being analysed. Neither the introduction nor the conclusion makes it clear that it is the role of mass media and propaganda that is being evaluated.



Always organise the argument being made around the given factor(s) outlined in the question.

Question 2

The less popular of the two choices, candidates were required to consider the accuracy of the statement that the failure of central planning played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1964-85. Candidates could approach this either by discussing the extent to which the failure of central planning played a significant role and/or by determining the role of the failure of central planning in relation to other significant factors. Many of the candidates who did opt for this question either misread the question – often referring to a lack of central planning – or had misconceptions as to central planning – with many thinking that central planning was a ‘catch-all’ phrase for communist policies in general. Many candidates also spent much of their response referring to Khrushchev’s policies while he was in power and so also misreading the time period being assessed. References to the legacies of both Stalin and Khrushchev while relevant did not require detailed descriptions of central planning under their rule. Of note as well, is that questions that cover 1964-85, or from indeed 1953-85, often lead to responses that are more descriptive or explanatory of the policies under the different leaders of the time rather than exploratory or discursive.

Stronger responses focused on the impact of central planning on the decline of the Soviet economy, referring to its stifling of initiative, the tendency towards inefficiency, the inability to adapt and the question of quantity versus quality, writing about this in relation to other factors such as the impact of the ‘social contract’, the military-industrial complex, an apathetic workforce and subsidies to the satellite states. Weaker responses mainly described Soviet economic policies across the period without differentiating the impact that they had in relation to either central planning or to the decline of the economy. Many responses were lacking in coherence as candidates struggled to explain the ‘lack of central planning’ rather than the failure of central planning.

This is a Level 5 response.

It is accurate to a certain extent to say that the failure of central planning played a significant role in the decline of the Soviet economy in the years 1969-85. The failures of Gosplan, the central economic planning agency, including allocating resources inefficiently and still setting propositional targets played a significant role in economic decline. Moreover, it is evident through the Kozygin reforms implemented between 1965 and 1970 which involved decentralised planning, that decentralised planning was far more effective at achieving economic growth, when compared to centralised planning. However, it is also necessary to consider the inherent issues within the economy, such as corruption ~~and~~ ^{and} a lack of economic coordination, but also the 'social contract' and the gerontocracy that emerged throughout Brezhnev's rule as factors that also played a critical, and significant, role in economic decline.

By 1985, Gosplan had suggested that 12% of machinery was never used, and this is likely because of an inefficient allocation

of resources from central planning. For example, by 1985 Gorbachev had set targets of 900 000 tractors to be produced each year but 20% of them were never used because of a lack of tractor drives. This represented a failure from central planning to efficiently allocate resources where they needed to go. This played a significant role in economic decline since resources were wasted and if used efficiently could have led to much higher growth. Moreover, the central planning system still used a system of targets that prioritised the quantity produced and not the quality of goods, rendering a large amount of production worthless. An old Soviet joke during this period ~~was~~ ridiculed the fact that car tyres were too thin and rubber car doors were too thick. By producing goods that were simply worthless, as a result of poor targets set by Gorbachev, this failure of ~~economic~~ ^{central} planning played a significant role in economic decline, as it made production uneconomic and wasted a large amount of resources.

However, it is necessary to understand that this system Brezhnev inherited in 1964 had inherent ~~flaw~~ issues, such as an inefficient central planning system that made production uneconomic and wasted a large amount of resources, a system that ~~has~~ found its roots in the 1930s under Stalin. Yet under the plans of Stalin considerable growth rates were still achieved, ~~amounting~~ ^{with} 17% growth between 1928 and 1940. A similar ^{central} economic planning system yet one period achieved significant economic growth and

the other led to economic decline. This therefore suggests that central the failures of central planning could not have played a significant role and economic decline must have been due to other factors, including the 'social contract'. Under Stalin, coercion and terror ensured labor discipline and a somewhat productive workforce, by Soviet standards. Yet the lack of terror as a result of destalinisation under Khrushchev, meant that by 1964 there was little ~~any~~^{ever} incentive to be productive. This was only furthered by the development of the 'social contract' which meant the government would provide a reasonable standard of living, ^{and} in return ~~for~~ would see obedience from citizens. The government financed this through rising oil revenues, rising from 245 million tonnes being produced in 1965 to 603 million tonnes being produced by 1980. This allowed the government to invest 10 million short tons of grain for the US in July 1973, thus allowing it to meet its end of the contract. The development of the 'social contract' also meant that the government did not close down any inefficient factories to ensure its policy of full employment, allowing it to provide a ^{reasonable} ~~best~~ standard of living. The 'social contract' led to Soviet workers joking, 'we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us'. Therefore, it could be argued that it was not the failures of central planning that played a ~~role~~ significant role in economic decline, considering a similar structure has been able to achieve formidable growth rates, but instead an unproductive workforce that resulted from a

from a programme of social benefits that rewarded obedience, thus ensuring economic decline as Soviet workers now had to do little to still ensure a livable livelihood.

On the other hand, from a different perspective it could still be argued that it was the failure of central planning that played a significant role in economic decline. From this perspective, ~~the~~ decentralised policies were able to achieve considerable economic growth during this period, whilst centralised policies failed to do so, suggesting it must have been ~~a failure of~~ ^{played a} centralised planning which ~~resulted in~~ ^{played a} significant role in economic decline. The Kossygin reforms (1965-70) allowed individuals/enterprises to plan economic production and used targets of cost/profit rather than output. These enterprises, free from control of ~~the~~ a central planning system, were much more productive and made such high profits that sometimes ~~of~~ up to 80% of revenue generated was able to be retained to the central government, after paying for all costs. By 1967, 1500 of 4000 trucking firms, all ~~over~~ 25 railroad systems and thousands more enterprises were following this enterprise model and forming the backbone of the economy, resulting in the economy growing by ~~more~~ between at a faster rate between 1966-70 when compared to 1961-65. It is therefore evident that if a decentralised system was able to achieve such considerable growth, it must have been a central planning system ~~direct~~

In conclusion, whilst the failure of central planning played a role in economic decline between 1962-85, it would not be accurate to say it was significant. More weight should go to the development of the 'social contract' and the emergence of a gerontocracy which simply resulted in a system that permitted no change and thus no growth. Large Annual increases in social benefits and rising oil revenues led to unproductivity and a preservation of the status quo, where the corrupt oligarchy had no incentive to change anything. It was this stagnation that played a significant role in economic decline between 1962-85.



This response is clearly exploring the role of central planning in the decline of the Soviet economy. It is discursive in its organisation and weighs up the role of central planning in the context of the time period of the question in a sustained manner. It uses references to the legacies of Stalin and Khrushchev to further the argument rather than describing or explaining their policies, as might be found in some Level 3 or low Level 4 responses.



High Level 4 and Level 5 answers explore the given factor by showing relationships between the key features of the period. Rather than listing factors or using stock paragraph introductions try to discuss the question that has been set.

Question 3

Question 3 was the more popular of the Section B questions. Candidates were asked to consider how significant the role of the secret police was in sustaining the Soviet regime from 1953-85. As this question was **not** asking whether the given factor was the 'most' significant factor, candidates could either approach this question by focusing on the extent to which the given factor was or was not significant or by considering its relative significance in relation to other factors, such as the control of mass media or the expansion of social security policies. It was clear that, in this series, candidates were more aware of the need to focus directly on the given factor than they were in 2023 and most centred their responses around the role of the secret police. There were, however, a significant number of candidates who would have preferred the question to be about the role of the secret police in controlling the people and responses often just asserted that key features/factors sustained the Soviet regime rather than explaining and analysing the relationships.

Unlike in Q2, where many responses unnecessarily referred to the Khrushchev period, a significant number of responses here began in 1964 rather than in 1953. Candidates should be aware of Khrushchev's policies regarding the secret police both from Key Theme 3 – attacks on opponents of government – and Key Theme 1 – Khrushchev's attempt to reform government including de-Stalinisation.

Stronger responses were targeted on the wording of the question and focused on the impact of the secret police in keeping the Soviet regime in charge. These included an analysis of relationships between key issues and a focus on the concept (significance/impact) in the question. These responses often referred to the lessening impact of the secret police under Khrushchev in comparison to attempts at social reform and to the re-emergence of different form of vigilance under Brezhnev and Andropov. The strongest responses often suggested that the role of the secret police may have changed after Khrushchev came to power but their presence continued to underwrite the regime throughout the period and/or that other factors came more into play from 1953.

Weaker responses often began in 1964 rather than in 1953 and often suggested that Andropov was the Soviet leader from 1953 without showing an understanding of his role as head of the secret police before he became the Soviet leader himself. Many responses just asserted that, because Khrushchev had reformed the role of the secret police, the secret police had no impact at all on the Soviet Union between 1953-64, and dismissed the given factor almost completely. Other responses merely described relevant factors rather than considering the impact that they had. There was a great deal of description of Andropov's policies against dissidents without explaining how this related to sustaining the Soviet regime.

This is a Level 3 response.

The ~~role~~ of the period of 1953-88 was a time of reform with Khrushchev followed by Brezhnev undoing it and letting the country stagnate. During this period the control of the people was very important in sustaining the Soviet Regime. Sustaining, being keeping the Regime going and not letting it fall apart. There were a couple key factors that helped this sustenance or hindered it. One being Brezhnev's use of the Secret police, another being Khrushchev's ~~plans~~ and his use of Anti-Terror.

During Brezhnev's ^{most significant} ~~main~~ factor of control from 64-82 was his use of the Secret police. In 1967 Andropov was appointed as head of the KGB. He was monumental in transcribing the look of a secret police that Khrushchev had left. His Repressive psychiatry institutions were set up for dissidents and just anyone Brezhnev wanted gone. ~~This meant~~ that so anyone 'against the party' could be sent for psychiatry treatment. This showed the level of control ~~the~~ Brezhnev could get over his enemies or just

the people of the USSR. This was the next control over the people during this time which will only be more obvious after discussing Khrushchev's thaw and his use of Antiterror. All of this effectively kept the USSR supporting

As discussed, Khrushchev's thaw in 1954 really summarised his lack of control over the people his only real want was de-stalinisation^{and communist ideology}. This shows his lack of control of the people in from 54-64. For example, during the thaw many books were unbanned, a major one being a day in the life of Ivan Denisovich, a book by Boris Pasternak which had been banned by Stalin as it was ~~critical~~ negative against him. This helps portray Khrushchev's main obsession about control being to lead the people to hate Stalin in order for his support. ~~However, the de-stal~~ However one part of society Khrushchev cracked down on hard was Religion. For example his anti-religion campaign shut down a lot of churches. As said discussed earlier this need for Khrushchev to de-stalinise is shown again here by slightly as Stalin ~~effect~~ reopened 414 churches during WW2. Overall

Khrushchev's control of the people doesn't really have a most significant role it was more just a combined effort to hate Stalin. However overall this left the USSR surviving albeit with a lot of issues, whereas Brezhnev's use of Secret police was definitely sustainable.

One thing significant ^{about} was Khrushchev's time in charge was his lack of use of Secret Police. For example they were only used in the execution of Beria in 1953. By Khrushchev wanted this Beria's death to be a symbol of Anti-terror. After this the Secret Police were rarely used till Brezhnev, the comparison of how Khrushchev was kicked out of power due to lack of control is very helpful. As Brezhnev was very security in power till his death mainly because of his control via the Secret Police. This lack of use by Khrushchev can be just as telling as it shows how the ~~can~~ USSR was sustaining much better under Brezhnev than Khrushchev.

In conclusion, the role of the ~~Secret~~ ^{Secret} police was very significant in the sustenance of the USSR. For example Under Khrushchev's rule and his control

being mainly arts & culture & and religion the USSR wasn't sustaining it was decreasing especially in a sense of control whereas Brezhnev increased the control and this led to the sustenance of the USSR Soviet Regime and one primary use was the Secret police.



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Examiner Comments

This response uses mostly accurate and relevant knowledge about the use of the secret police in sustaining the Soviet regime. It does attempt to establish criteria for judgement based on whether the secret police sustained or hindered the regime and shows an understanding of the reforms under Khrushchev and the policies under Brezhnev. The response lacks some range and does show the general trend of the argument but the organisation of the material lacks coherence. The question is more orientated towards control of the people than sustaining the Soviet regime.



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This response has some good analysis and could have moved from Level 3 into Level 4 with better organisation of the material being discussed, greater coverage of the time period and greater development of the points being made.

Question 4

This question required candidates to consider the accuracy of the statement that, in the years 1917-85, the Soviet regime's attitudes towards the family as a social unit did not change. Most candidates chose a chronological approach while others looked more thematically at the various roles within the family. Many candidates focused on the role and status of women in general rather than the attitudes toward the family as a social unit. While it was valid for candidates to consider the role of women within the family as part of attitudes toward the family as a social unit, it was not valid for the focus of the response to be mainly about attitudes towards women in general. Many good responses remained in Level 4 because it was not clear whether candidates really understood the concept of the family as a social unit. Candidates often asserted that under Lenin the regime had a positive attitude towards the family as a social unit because of the liberal policies towards women's reproductive and marriage rights without any awareness of the ideological opposition to family at the time or the impact on the family as a social unit. The specification does require knowledge and understanding of the concept of the family as a social unit and candidates need to be aware that this does not necessarily correspond to attitudes towards the rights of women.

As in previous series, there was also a tendency to look at the attitude of the leaders but it is accepted that it is difficult not to see the attitude of the individual leaders as the attitude of the government of a specific time period, particularly after 1928. There were some candidates, however, who were able to consider structural attitudes over the whole time period including being able to analyse the change from the initial Bolshevik antipathy towards family back to more conservative attitudes towards the family after the 'Great Retreat' (1936) with any changes in the post-Stalinist era being related to social and economic support for the family.

Stronger responses were focused on the wording of the question and really attempted to view government attitudes to the family as a social unit. Some responses were able to show how the radical opposition to bourgeois family values of the early Soviet regime resulted in attempts to redefine the concept of family but that after Stalin's accession to power conservative values once again emerged to be redefined as a 'patriotic duty'.

Weaker responses tended to describe and explain, rather than explore, different elements of family policy with an emphasis on Lenin and Stalin and on women and divorce. These responses also tended to suggest that Khrushchev reverted to Leninist policies and that Brezhnev and subsequent leaders were Stalinist. These responses were often limited in development and lacking in coherence and structure, particularly losing coherence in the long chronological responses.

This is a Level 5 response.

The role of the family as a social unit was critical for many years of the Soviet regime. However, despite the ongoing importance it held in the years following Stalin's 1936 'Great Retreat' we can see the period before as a promotion of more liberal social values, under Alexander Kollontai. As such, while the Soviet attitudes towards the family as a social unit remained consistent following 1936, the changes before signal a major attitude change away from the traditional viewpoint.

The Leninist period began by the 1918 constitution making men and women equal, instantly reversing, previously repressive Tsarist attitudes. The commission of a Women's Commission - Zhenotdel - also furthered the growing push for change to the family. As such, the 1918 family code made the social unit wholly more flexible - in line with Kollontai's idea of "withering away the family" and Lenin's policy of common living - *Kommunalka*. The shift to make divorce cheaper and more accessible, give greater provisions to unmarried

women, and giving the same status to registered and non registered marriages allowed a breakdown of more traditional attitudes. The promotion of women in work was also critical in changing the family unit, as the 2 million industrial workers by 1931 gave much increased financial freedom. The legislation of abortion in 1918 was also critical, as it demonstrated a wholly more radical approach to the family. As such we can view the period of Lenin as producing massive change to the idea of the family, offering a more liberal attitude, distinct from other Soviet leaders.

The period of Stalin is characterised by the 'Great Retreat', but his 1930 policy changes also show a major change in family policy. The closure of Zhenotdel in 1930 ended female based policy changes, while the announcement of a doubling of education places by 1940 demonstrated a long term vision to grow the family. The Great Retreat was however the critical point, as it reversed almost all changes of Lenin, a reversal to a much more traditional view of the family.

The attack on divorce was critical. After 1926 legislation allowed 'post-nuptial divorces', Stalin reversed this law, and coupled it with a steep increase in the cost of divorce, up to a month's wages. Birth rates were all attacked, with Stalin promoting the policy of 7 and 11 births, as well as 'socialist realism' propaganda reflecting the importance of mother's in the Soviet regime. Stalin banned contraceptives, while also criminalising abortion and homosexuality, ending the liberalisation of Lenin. His attacks on Leningrad, branding it an "illness" in 1937, offered a clear view of a return to more traditional family structures. This message was only further constructed by propaganda campaigns showing Stalin as a caring and devoted father. ~~Stalin~~ ~~never~~ As Stalin reversed back to more traditional values, the purging of Kollontai in 1937 shows a re-emphasised need for policy change in reference to the family as a social unit. As such, we can look at the critical policy changes of Stalin in reference to this issue as strongly promoting the idea of the family. This enormous shift in position

Leninist policies demonstrates the idea clearly that views on the family as a social unit did indeed change markedly in the period.

The period under Khrushchev shows a similar attitude to the family with slight alterations. The Khrushchev policy was indicated by a 1957 speech in which he referred to provisions of the family as a "necessary part of Soviet society". This clear promotion enables us to view his policy change in a light similar to Stalin's. The introduction of the 'Babushkin' role for upper class families ~~was~~ demonstrates how family care became essential for Khrushchev. Similarly his promotion of the 'double shift' i.e. woman both working and being a mother shows the role the family was expected to play in society. In addition his provision of 112 days a maternity pay, and a weeks paternity pay demonstrates a clear focus on merging the family with the welfare. In addition, his policy on education, introducing over 5 million students and 150,000 teachers, as well as the crucial role the Komsomol youth group played in society, demonstrates a

clear continuation of Stalinist promotion of the family unit. As such, we can evidently view the Khrushchev policy changes towards the family as continuing along the Stalinist path of a moderate approach. Despite his legalization of abortion in 1955, the policy remains remarkably similar to the Stalinist era, as we must recognize this as a clear continuation of policy towards the family as a social unit.

The Brezhnev period, coupled with the changes of Andropov and Ghermenko all work to continue the Stalinist policy on the family as a social unit. The 1968 family code is critical for Brezhnev, as it looked to target the fundamental issue of divorce, which concerned 1/3 of marriages by 1964. The setting up of 'Wedding approval councils', along with a months notice for marriage was meant to instill more stability to the family. In addition, the 1968 provision of a doubling of ~~recreational~~ nursery places was never met, but shows an attitude of support for the family. The issue of falling birth rates show a challenge to the continuation of policy. While 2.9 children per

family was increased in 1934, the fall to 1.9 by 1982 demonstrated a stagnant population growth at 0.3%. The introduction of Ghermenko of birth targets in November 1984 not only shows promotion of the family unit, but an attitude of necessity towards it. Brezhnev and Andropov also introduced reforms and policy focused on the issue of alcoholism, which entailed 17 million alcoholics by 1980. The 1979 ban of vodka, which was 1st a year & was consumed on average, as well as laws for public drunkenness, attacked the issue attached to 58% of drivers. However, despite the "Operation Front" policy of Andropov, no reduction was made, and alcoholism grew to 20 million by 1987. As such, we can view the leadership of Brezhnev, Andropov and Ghermenko as all contributing to promote the family unit, owing to its necessity to Soviet life. This continues the trend of Stalin's moderate policy defining the post Lenin era.

As too concludes, by looking at the divide in policy between Lenin, and the other leaders of the Soviet Union, we can observe the enormous shifts. However, following this move away from

(Section B continued)

social policies under ^{Lenin *} ~~Khrushchev~~, the continuation of promotion of the family as a necessary building block of Soviet society was essential. As such we can assess the divide in policy between Lenin and other leaders, and then recognise the following continuation after the 1936 Great Retreat,

* and then ^{the} shift under Stalin.



ResultsPlus
Examiner Comments

This response is focused on the concept of the family as a social unit using a chronological approach. It clearly shows its understanding that the period under Lenin was a time of upheaval for 'traditional' views of the role and purpose of the family within Communist Russia.



ResultsPlus
Examiner Tip

If using a chronological approach, always make sure that you plan your response to cover as much of the time period as possible so that you do not spend too much time on the earlier period. Here the period from 1917-28 is vital to set up the argument for change but the response manages to cover the whole time period sufficiently to meet the demands of the question.

This is a Level 5 response.

The ideology and policy regarding the family as a social unit changed several times across the time period between 1917 and 1985. Lenin's idealistic - but not necessarily effective - policies were struck down by Stalin, and though ^{greater} liberalisation occurred under Khrushchev, ideas about the family remained ^{mostly} stagnant under his and Brezhnev's regimes. These changing policies and practices mean that it is ~~entirely~~ ^{mostly} inaccurate to say that the regime's attitudes towards the family unit did not change. It is 'mostly' so because of the dominance of traditional attitudes from 1928 to 1985.

The general ideology of Soviet leaders influenced their attitudes towards the family unit. Lenin, with ~~Communist Party~~ colleagues such as ~~Kollontai~~, initiated a ~~series~~ though relatively conservative in his own beliefs about the family, allowed Alexandra Kollontai a significant platform to express her beliefs. Kollontai rejected the nuclear family, proposing ideas about non-monogamy and free love in

Communist society. As head of Zhenotdel, the Women's wing of the party, she spread these ideas among the population. Lenin, while sceptical, did ~~allow a greater access to~~ allow her to maintain her position until after the Civil War, which reflects his more liberal attitude and acceptance of pluralistic ideas. Stalin, meanwhile, ~~clearly~~ rejected ~~as~~ these experimental ideas and enforced a society of traditional family roles, with propaganda stressing the ~~trade~~ stereotypical roles of men and women. However, this did change within Stalin's regime as he spread propaganda in the second World War about female troops, such as the sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko who claimed to shoot over 300 Nazis. This brief ~~to~~ power afforded to women in propaganda changed the role of women in the family only briefly, as women were expelled from the army once again at the end of the war, and ~~so~~ returning male soldiers reclaimed their higher-paid jobs at home.

③ Khrushchev and Brezhnev continued to promote ~~as~~ traditional family roles, with ~~that~~ Khrushchev encouraging men to educate their

children rather than women, who were regarded as too susceptible to religion. Brezhnev initiated a pro-natal campaign stressing the importance of a woman's role as mother of the family, and a man's role to provide. This would suggest that while traditional family ideology dominated the regime from 1928, over the entire time period there were significant changes, including even within Stalin's regime. The ideology of Soviet leaders cannot be regarded as consistent about family roles.

~~The role of~~ Soviet leaders also influenced family life by changing employment patterns throughout the time period. This was once again more consistent from 1928. ^{Under} ~~to~~ Lenin's regime, ~~though comp~~ compulsory employment during 'war communism' was extended to only able-bodied men, meaning ^{many} women continued to stay at home. Female unemployment only increased in the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP) under which returning soldiers from the Civil War reclaimed their jobs. Women were far more likely to be unemployed, enforcing their homemaking role in the family.

However, due to general poverty, most women needed to work for survival, driving many into prostitution. It is estimated that in the 1920s, 39% of men in Moscow regularly saw prostitutes. Women therefore did ~~continue~~ play a role in providing for their families even as female unemployment rose. Under Stalin, this family structure was transformed completely. The Five Year Plan targets required full employment, meaning women acquired factory work, making up 49% of the workforce by the start of the Second World War. This did not change their role in the home, however, merely creating a 'double shift' under which women played the role ~~of~~ ^{of} both provider and homemaker, continuing to perform household chores and raise children. ~~The~~ A further change to the family under Stalin's employment structure was the role of children. Children in 'Labour Reserve schools' essentially became unpaid factory workers, experiencing the ^{same} quotas and labour discipline as their parents. This ~~is~~ demonstrates how Stalin changed the fundamental structure of the family, bringing women and children into the workplace,

while maintaining traditional roles at home.

Full employment continued under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, though it became increasingly clear that women's work was not equally paid. Women under Khrushchev's 'Virgin Land Scheme' were usually milkmaids or performing other forms of manual labour. This role was paid 15% of a tractor driver's pay. This limited woman's role as a provider for the family, and forced her to remain dependent on men for money, which served to promote the structure of the nuclear family. Similarly, under Brezhnev, educated women made up 70% of teachers and doctors, but factory managers remained better-paid. Khrushchev and Brezhnev's attitudes to the family at work were therefore similar to Stalin's, with women contributing to the economy but not (financially) to their families. The origin of this system can be traced back to the preference of men in Lenin's NEP employment, which would suggest that in terms of employment structures, the attitude towards family and gender roles remained remarkably consistent.

Finally, Soviet leaders changed the family unit by changing the rights ~~of~~ of citizens.

Lenin, fitting with the liberal ideas of the revolution, legalised abortion, contraception, and even homosexuality. This marks a very liberal attitude of the regime at the time.

However, this was all reversed in Stalin's 'Great Retreat' (1936) which ended the right to abortion and homosexuality, and made divorce very expensive. This is the ^a first significant difference between leaders over rights. Stalin's restrictions enforced a return to nuclear families and a significant limitation on women's personal power within the family. Khrushchev reversed this once again, legalising abortion in 1955, but his encouragement of traditional family roles undermined this commitment.

~~Brezhnev made very few changes to family rights, but was arguably~~ His most significant provision was perhaps the K-7 'Khrushchyovki' apartment block, 10x the size of a family's space under Stalin, which provided privacy and space for families. ~~This~~ While not necessarily liberalising the family unit, this

did arguably allow them to become closer-knit. Brezhnev made very few legal changes to the family during his regime, again marking a stagnation in policy. These changing legal allowances: liberalisation to restriction and back to (relative) liberalisation would suggest that the regime's attitudes to the family unit did change significantly.

Overall attitudes towards the family unit did change significantly. Lenin initiated liberal policies rooted in Kollontai's revolutionary ideology, freeing women from their traditional roles, but failing to ensure equal employment.

Stalin initiated legal restrictions and promoted the nuclear family but provided work for all members of the family. Khrushchev ended aspects of Stalin's liberalisation while promoting traditionalism, and these policies were continued ~~under Brezhnev~~ until 1985. Overall it could therefore be evaluated that attitudes towards the family did change, but traditionality dominated from 1928, despite Khrushchev's small reforms.



This response focuses on attitudes towards the family as a social unit through a thematic approach. It analyses different aspects of the family in relation to the differing ideals of the communist leadership with regard to the role of the family within Soviet society. It deals with the ideological role of the family, employment and rights.



Using a thematic approach can often lead clearly to a sustained analysis of the key features.

Question 5

Stronger responses developed a clear extract-based analysis of the extent to which the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government. Such responses explored most of the arguments raised within the extracts. (Extract 1 centred on Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government with reference to Yeltsin's open opposition to Gorbachev as the newly elected president of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin's influence on the growth of nationalism within the Soviet Union, Yeltsin's role in leading the resistance to August 1991 attempted coup and his role in putting Gorbachev on the backfoot in the events unfolding in the USSR. Extract 2 centred on the unintended consequences of Gorbachev's reforms including the undermining of the principal features of Communism and the shocked reaction of many within the Communist Party.) Contextual knowledge was also used effectively to validate/challenge the views provided in the extracts, such as the circumstances surrounding Yeltsin's emergence as the president of the Russian Republic, Yeltsin's exact role in the August 1991 attempted coup, the impact of Gorbachev's reform policies and the reactions of Soviet politicians, both hardliners and supporters of Gorbachev. The best responses were able to note that nationalism in the republics and the fact that Gorbachev was always trying to keep up with unfolding events were key elements of both extracts. These responses also came to a reasoned judgement on the given view, referencing the views in the extracts; this is essential to meet the requirement for bullet point 3 in the mark scheme.

Most candidates found Extract 2 to be more convincing than the view regarding Yeltsin's role in Extract 1. However, this led to many unbalanced responses where the view under consideration was dealt with less effectively than the alternate view. Stronger responses tended to consider the view under question, first using Extract 2 to counter the agency of Yeltsin. Many good Level 4 responses did not get into Level 5 because they often only gave Extract 1 cursory consideration and wrote a response centred on Gorbachev rather than using Extract 2 and contextual knowledge to challenge the validity of Yeltsin's role. There seemed to be less knowledge of Yeltsin's role than the impact of Gorbachev's reforms.

Weaker candidates showed some understanding of the extracts but tended to select quotations or describe what was in the extracts. Quite often these candidates only read the first few sentences of each interpretation commenting mainly on the role of Yeltsin as president of the Russian Republic from Extract 1 and the reforms of Gorbachev from Extract 2. This meant that many responses failed to comprehend or analyse the material in the extracts relating to Yeltsin's role in opposing the coup attempt and Gorbachev's inability to comprehend the consequences of his actions. It is vital that candidates read and use all the material available to them in the extracts. Examiners also noted that some candidates confused Yeltsin's role in August 1991 believing him to be the instigator of the coup. Many candidates wrote generalised accounts of the role of nationalism rather than picking up on the specific examples mentioned in the extracts, such as Lithuania and Ukraine. Many weaker responses also found both extracts 'convincing' and failed to reach a judgement.

On a final note, candidates often use the first opening of a McDonald's in Moscow in 1990 as an example of free market enterprise in their responses. This is not always helpful to responses but is relevant to the time period. Gorbachev's appearance in a Pizza Hut advertisement, however, did not happen until the late 1990s and appears not to have been shown in Russia.

This is a Level 3 response.

- 5 In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of Boris Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

Extract 1: Yeltsin

(20)

Extract 2: Gorbachev's reforms.

Extract 1 discusses the idea that the USSR collapsed due to the opposition from Boris Yeltsin. Whilst I agree that this has some prominence, I don't find it as convincing as Extract 2 which discusses Gorbachev's political reforms. Overall, I am convinced that Yeltsin's opposition had a slight part to play in the collapse but I don't believe that it had as much prominence as Gorbachev's political reforms.

Extract 1 states that 'Yeltsin got his parliament to declare Russia a self-governing republic'. This arguably is a convincing argument as this is a declaration of independence from the USSR and if Russia does it, other countries would follow. This ultimately would lead to the collapse of the USSR. This demonstrates Yeltsin's opposition to the Soviet government as he wished for a purely independent government for Russia meaning that the USSR government was significantly losing power and authority. This also

would lead to the collapse of the Union as the centralised government would crack and fall apart. However, it could be argued that this would have happened anyway due to Gorbachev's radical political reforms of glasnost and perestroika as Extract 2 suggests. Extract 2 states that 'features of communism were being undermined by Gorbachev's reforming activity'. This suggests that the government ultimately would have collapsed due to the reforms as they the reforms were moving away from what the government stood and pushed for. The idea that communism was being undermined would have caused the collapse as this was a key aspect of the USSR government and society. Additionally, 'perestroika' means reconstruction leading us to question how much Gorbachev truly wanted to change and whether the reconstruction went too far to a point where it was an unrecognisable union (no longer the USSR leading to collapse). Extract 2 states 'perestroika had become a project for total transformation'. I find this convincing as a reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union as it suggests a total shift and suggests that the Soviet Union withered away and collapsed because it had been totally changed.

Extract 1 puts across the point that Yeltsin 'took the opportunity to crush the communist party'. This was the central party of power and by the end there was limited if any oppositional candidates. Extract 1 suggests that the demolition of the party would have led to the collapse of the Union as there would no longer be a centre of political power. I do find this slightly convincing but ultimately if there had been any opposition (which there could have been) the crushing of one party wouldn't make a ^{demolition} difference as someone else would take control. Additionally, the people of Russia and the Soviet Union remained communist so I do not find Extract 1's point, of the crushing of the communist party very convincing. It could potentially have been a contributing factor but I do not believe that it was the main reason.

Extract 2 gives that the idea that Gorbachev's reforms were too late as Gorbachev always lagged behind the deepening crisis affecting the economy, the republics and the personnel of the Soviet system. This suggests that due to Gorbachev's lack of intervention before and the failure of reforms the Soviet Union collapsed. I find this convincing as Gorbachev was at the centre of power in the Politburo so his actions would have had significant influence. Extract 2

suggests that this arguable ignorance affected the entire union and therefore led to its collapse at the hands of Gorbachev and his failed political reforms: glasnost and perestroika.

To conclude, I find Extract 1's argument that the Soviet Union collapsed due to opposition from Boris Yeltsin slightly convincing but I find Extract 2's argument of Gorbachev's political reforms more convincing. This is due to Gorbachev's power and influence as he was at the political centre of the USSR.



ResultsPlus
Examiner Comments

Here the response is clearly based around the Extracts. It shows understanding of the key views of the Extracts by selecting key points and explaining them. There is some contextual knowledge but this is generalised and brief. A judgement is given and is related to the views in the Extracts but could have been better substantiated by including more contextual knowledge.



ResultsPlus
Examiner Tip

Use contextual knowledge to validate or challenge the views being put forward in the Extracts.

This is a Level 5 response.

Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985, but by the end of 1991, it had completely collapsed. Extract 1, puts this collapse in the hands of Yeltsin, whereas Extract 2 blames Gorbachev's reforms. Extract 2's argument is more convincing because Yeltsin was a product of Gorbachev's mistakes.

~~made him a threat~~
Extract 1 provides some convincing arguments as to Yeltsin's ~~difficult~~ actions, ^{which helped to} bring down the Soviet regime. One of the key points Westwood is making, considers Yeltsin's rise in popularity. As his ~~status~~ "new status" increased, he became ~~more~~ the Kremlin's principle political threat. The extract claims that by 1990 Gorbachev and Yeltsin "openly opposed" each other. ~~At~~ Initially Yeltsin had been promoted by Gorbachev in 1985, however as his reforming ideas became more radical, ~~there~~ a rift was created in their relationship. The Inter Regional Group headed by Yeltsin, persecuted the Central Committee. Gorbachev was caught between hardliners and reformers, who openly opposed him. Gorbachev was forced to remove Yeltsin, who was then elected to the Russian Congress in ~~the~~ 1989 with a staggering 89% of the vote. From this position Yeltsin now had the power to actively undermine Gorbachev.

* Gorbachev had helped him create

Mr. Service, in Extract 2, consolidates this point when he claims that Gorbachev brought problems onto himself by choosing to promote people who had a "serious commitment to reform". Yeltsin is a key example of Gorbachev's mistakes. Not only did he promote a man, who was clearly an opportunist and wouldn't hesitate to bring him down, he also made the crucial error of firing him. This, ~~but~~ ^{by not} ~~let~~ ^{weakened} Yeltsin ~~powerbase~~ ^{powerbase} and then firing him, allowed him to use this influence ~~powerbase~~ without restrictions. A typical example of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer. The subsequent events were predictable and within a year of resigning from the Communist Party altogether in 1990, Yeltsin has brought the whole system down. Both extracts used together, give convincing evidence as to Gorbachev's mistakes leading to Yeltsin's power. This is why the view that Yeltsin brought down the Soviet Union is unconvincing, Gorbachev ~~allowed him to do so~~ ^{facilitated his actions}.

Extract 1 provides more evidence as to why Yeltsin should be blamed for the collapse of the Soviet Union, specifically his actions in the August Coup. As he led the "popular resistance" he became the "hero of the hour". This was the key moment in which Gorbachev lost all the remnants of his power. As previously mentioned, Yeltsin had created a power base, and when 200,000 people turned up to help him defend Moscow from August Coup hardliners, it was a symbolic changing of power. Yeltsin demanded Gorbachev be returned, but then proceeded to undermine him entirely. Yeltsin's actions in 1991 were the final nail in the Soviet Union's coffin.

When he "suspended the activities of the Communist Party in the Russian Republic", the USSR were essentially banned from their ^{power base} ~~power~~ ^{country} base. Yeltsin also rejected Gorbachev's Union Treaty, a last attempt to keep the Soviet Union afloat. Instead he rejected the Commonwealth Treaty he had created, which had far looser ties. There is no doubt that Yeltsin was the final straw - he was the final factor that brought the Soviet Union to the floor. However it would be inaccurate to not realise that it was already on its knees. Yeltsin was an opportunist who took advantage of a situation, but Extract 2's view that Gorbachev is to blame is more convincing.

Service blames Gorbachev because the Soviet Union had been "undermined by Gorbachev's reforming". Service highlights perestroika which resulted in the "disintegration of the existing system". Perestroika was so catastrophic that it led to the 500 day programme. Perestroika failed because the party was split between reformers and conservatives. Therefore policies like the Decree on Cooperatives in 1989, were only implemented by half of the party. In some cases private shops were forced to accept bribes from corrupt officials just to stay open. Gorbachev underestimated the opposition his reforms would face. When the 500 day programme also lost control of his policies as shown by the 500 day programme to a market economy. Gorbachev had never wanted to be this radical and naively thought he could introduce elements of capitalism without becoming a market led economy. When the 500 day programme was accepted by Russian Congress but rejected by the

Some, it resulted in a 20% drop in the economy between 1990 and 1991. This is another example (as his treatment of Yeltsin had been), of Gorbachev's naivety. Similarly he thought he could encourage nationalism without the threat of countries "seceding from the USSR". He removed the Brezhnev doctrine in 1985 and within 4 years, all of the Eastern European governments had collapsed. This led to nationalism within the USSR. Westwood believes this strengthened Yeltsin's position, as a Russian nationalist, ~~even~~ because of "Lithuania's recent declaration of independence". A theme emerges, that Gorbachev understands the need for reform, but then loses control of what he starts. He was naive across an extensive range of policy, and his inability to stop the snowball of change, started by his own actions, led to Yeltsin, and also the collapse of the system.

In conclusion, the view that the USSR collapsed because of Yeltsin's opposition is unconvincing. Although Yeltsin undertook the final acts that unravelled the Union, he was a consequence of Gorbachev's actions - Service is more convincing when he argues that Gorbachev's reforms ended the USSR. Not only did he allow Yeltsin to build a powerbase, he also undid key government structures, like the command economy and the Brezhnev Doctrine which kept the Red Block behind the Iron Curtain together. This is why Gorbachev is to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union.



In this response, the Extracts are clearly seen as historical interpretations and the argument is centred around the views of the authors. The main viewpoints of each Extract are identified and discussed in relation to the differences between them and in comparison to each other. Sufficient contextual knowledge is used to validate and/or challenge the points being made.



It is important to understand that the Extracts are written by historians and that it is the author's views within the material provided that are being evaluated.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

Section A/B responses

Features commonly found in responses which were successful within the higher Levels:

- Candidates paying close attention to the date ranges in the question.
- Sufficient consideration being given to the issue focused upon in the question.
- Candidates explaining their judgement fully with a focus on relative significance.
- Focusing carefully on the second-order concept(s) targeted in the question.
- An appropriate level of knowledge, in terms of depth of detail and supported analysis – for example, a realistic amount of knowledge to enable a balanced and rounded answer on breadth questions.
- Evidence of planning.

Common issues which hindered performance:

- Paying little heed to the precise demands of the question, for example, writing about the topic without focusing on the question, or attempting to give an answer to a different question than the one that has been asked.
- Answering a question without giving sufficient consideration to the given issue in the question. For example, looking at other causes, consequences, with only limited reference to the issue/factor/key feature given in the question.
- Failure to consider the date range as specified in the question
- Assertion of change and causation while using the formulaic repetition of the words of the question.
- A judgement not being reached or explained.
- A lack of sufficient supporting detail.

Section C responses

Features commonly found in responses which were successful within the higher Levels:

- Candidates paying close attention to the precise demands of the question
- Thorough use of the extracts – though this need not mean using every point they raise.
- A confident attempt to use the two extracts together, such as consideration of their differences, attempts to compare their arguments, or evaluate their relative merits.
- Careful use of historical contextual knowledge – clearly selected to relate to the issues raised within the extracts and confidently used to examine the arguments made.
- Careful reading of the extracts.
- Attempts to see beyond the obvious differences between sources, such as, consideration of the extent to which they disagreed, or where appropriate an attempt to reconcile their arguments.
- Confident handling of the extracts allied to a sharp focus on the arguments given, recognising the distinct skills demanded by A03.
- Evidence of planning using the extracts as the basis of the answer.

Common issues which hindered performance:

- Limited or uneven use of the extracts, for example, extensive use of one extract, with limited consideration of the other.
- Limited comparison or consideration of the differences between the given interpretations.
- Using the extracts merely as sources of evidentiary support.
- The use of pre-prepared material covering the more general controversy as outlined in the specification.
- Discussing the issues in the extracts without acknowledging that they are matters of interpretation being presented by historians.
- Evaluating the extracts using AO2 skills of source analysis.

Grade boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

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