

Examiners' Report
June 2014

GCE History 6HI03 D

Edexcel and BTEC Qualifications

Edexcel and BTEC qualifications come from Pearson, the UK's largest awarding body. We provide a wide range of qualifications including academic, vocational, occupational and specific programmes for employers. For further information visit our qualifications websites at www.edexcel.com or www.btec.co.uk.

Alternatively, you can get in touch with us using the details on our contact us page at www.edexcel.com/contactus.



Giving you insight to inform next steps

ResultsPlus is Pearson's free online service giving instant and detailed analysis of your students' exam results.

- See students' scores for every exam question.
- Understand how your students' performance compares with class and national averages.
- Identify potential topics, skills and types of question where students may need to develop their learning further.

For more information on ResultsPlus, or to log in, visit www.edexcel.com/resultsplus. Your exams officer will be able to set up your ResultsPlus account in minutes via Edexcel Online.

Pearson: helping people progress, everywhere

Pearson aspires to be the world's leading learning company. Our aim is to help everyone progress in their lives through education. We believe in every kind of learning, for all kinds of people, wherever they are in the world. We've been involved in education for over 150 years, and by working across 70 countries, in 100 languages, we have built an international reputation for our commitment to high standards and raising achievement through innovation in education. Find out more about how we can help you and your students at: www.pearson.com/uk.

June 2014

Publications Code UA039099

All the material in this publication is copyright
© Pearson Education Ltd 2014

Introduction

The paper was divided into two sections: Section A was an In-Depth Study question, and Section B an Associated Historical Controversy question. By a large majority, more entrants sat *D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany 1900-45* than *D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60*.

It was pleasing to see a good standard of responses in this examination series. Many candidates wrote insightful comments and very few candidates produced essays which were devoid of analysis. Unfortunately, some candidates continue to write too much generalised comment. As a consequence, their responses lacked precise analytical focus and detailed supporting evidence. Examiners want to see that candidates can use the sources and their own material effectively to answer the questions set.

The main weakness in responses which scored less well tended to be a lack of sufficient knowledge, rather than lengthy descriptive writing without analysis. The paper provided candidates with the opportunity to develop their essay writing and to include source material as and when necessary.

There appears to be an increasing tendency for candidates to analyse and produce judgements in the main body of the answer and have cursory conclusions. Candidates can indeed sustain arguments by these means and this approach does not, in itself, prevent access to the highest levels. However, in some cases, judgements on individual issues and factors tended to be somewhat isolated, and ultimate conclusions were either only partially stated or implicit. Consequently, candidates should be aware that considered introductions and conclusions often provide a solid framework for sustained argument and evaluation.

The answers of a minority of less successful candidates in Section A suggested that they lacked the detailed knowledge base required to tackle these questions and produced a catch-all commentary on the stipulated topic. The best answers to Section A questions showed some impressive study of 20th century German and British history, with students producing incisive, scholarly analysis.


When attempting the Section B questions, a small number of candidates engaged more with the general debate of the set controversy, rather than the specific demands of the question and source package. This was most evident on Questions 6 and 7, although it was still a small minority.

Centres should note that the amount of space provided in the booklet for answers is more than enough for full marks.

Although a few responses were quite brief, there was little evidence on this paper of candidates having insufficient time to answer both questions.

Question 1

This was the more popular choice for candidates sitting Option D1. The vast majority of candidates were able to draw on a range of material from across the period 1919-29, and thankfully most were able to remain within this date range. Most candidates were able to focus to some degree on the analytical demands of the question, although less successful responses tended to provide a survey of issues relating to Weimar democracy, or offered points concerning success and failure, but with limited focus on the 'democratic experiment'. Many candidates tended to divide the period, with coverage somewhat stronger on the period 1919-23. There was a tendency for some to polarise these periods, with the former being seen as a failure and the latter a success, although there seemed a preference for the earlier part of the period, although most were able to explore the nuances within these. Candidates took differing approaches, with some focusing almost exclusively on political and constitutional aspects of the period, with others broadening this to consider economic, social and even cultural aspects of the period. Both approaches were equally rewarded where appropriate, although some candidates taking the broader approach were not always convincing in relating material back to the question. There were also occasions where candidates appeared to rework previous questions, with obvious limitations. However, many examples showed a detailed knowledge and were able structure an argument, were analytical in nature and sometimes sustained in terms of quality. Indeed, there was often convincing coverage of political, social and economic aspects. This included an understanding of how the nature and extent of success of the political experiment changed over time.



The democratic experiment of the Weimar Republic has much to argue for its success between 1919 to 1929, such as increasing support for German democracy from without and below, as well as a seemingly prosperous economy. These successes become even more significant in the context of its rocky and fragile start until 1924. However, there were also dangerous undercurrents in the Republic, such as immature politics which looked support from above.

and worrying economic trends like dependence on foreign ~~and~~ economies.

(Section A continued) The first indicator of success for the democratic experiment in Germany is between 1919 and 1929, was that it enjoyed public support and foreign support by the end of the period. From 3 major coup attempts ~~between~~ and over 360 political murders between 1919 and 1924, to ~~demolish~~^{undo} democratic parties receiving 75% of the vote in 1928, indicates the democratic experiment gained huge support from the people between 1919 and 1924. This was also replicated on the world stage. From the Ruhr occupation and crisis of 1923, the Weimar Germany, mainly due to the actions of Stresemann, managed to implement the Dawes plan and reduce reparations to 2 billion marks a year, ~~and~~ as well as become a member of the ~~League~~ League of Nations in 1926. This suggests a great growth of support from foreign powers, as well as domestically, for the democratic experiment, and should be seen as a significant success.

Much of this ~~pop~~ growth in popular support for the Weimar Republic in 1919-1924, came from satisfaction at growing economic prosperity, another ~~Weimar~~ seeming Weimar success. In 1928, National income was 13% higher than in 1913 and wages rose every year between ~~1919~~ 1924 and 1929, partly due to the mediation process. Finally, foreign support also meant huge investments,

(Section A continued) such as 25.5 billion marks from the USA, meant the Weimar economy was a booming & seeming economic success in 1928, despite having suffered hyper-inflation in just 1923. This significant growth in economic prosperity and seeming stability may be counted as one of the Weimar republic's most significant successes between 1919 and 1929.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This response to question 1 was given a high level 4. A brief plan sets out the issues to be examined, demonstrating an understanding of the question focus. The introduction takes this a stage further, briefly setting out the main arguments that will be followed throughout the essay. The candidate then develops focused points, deploying well-chosen own knowledge to analyse the success of the democratic experiment.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

For a level 5 response, sustained argument and evaluation would be expected. On a question like this, it would mean exploring every issue and weighing up the extent to which it was a success throughout the essay, clearly exploring the notion of the democratic experiment.

Question 2

Whilst this was the less popular choice in Option D1, it was largely well answered, with most students able to offer relevant material with some degree of focus. Some candidates seemed to see this as an invitation to offer content-led responses which were not always geared towards the question, although many accessed the higher levels. Common arguments included consideration of the impact the overlapping agencies and responsibilities of the 'chaotic state' had on production, shortages of labour, failings in mobilisation, problems with raw materials, shortage of labour and the role of Speer. Astute contrasts were made by those considering the improvements in efficiency under the latter. Relative to other questions, many candidates did offer some very specific knowledge and statistic on production. What often discriminated in the success of responses was the extent to which they could shape issues to the question. For example, some candidates offered relevant information regarding limited raw materials, or the Soviet scorched earth policy, or even the extent to which the Nazi war effort was geared towards conflict of a more limited duration and nature, yet struggled to utilise this within argument over efficiency. The most successful were able to weigh the range of issues and indeed tensions within war production.

Plan

1. Lack of Raw material

- out produced by allies (USA, Britain)
- scorched earth policy

2. Speer appointment

- central planning
- tanks up by 25%
- ammunition up 97%
- total war production 59%
- However still was not enough

3. Radical structure chaotic

- Minister Goering, Gander, Himmler, Ministry of armaments
- Working towards Fuhrer

4. Mistake by Goering

- did introduce mass production via rockets
- ersatz goods handicaps war economy but production.

5. Shortcomings of Goering

- Lack of labour
- mobilisation women
- slower labour

(Section A continued)

With World War 2 The Nazis were now fully engaged with in WW2. Fighting Britain, USA and USSR all at once. However one the main downfall behind Nazi defeat was that their poor war economy hindered war production enabling the allies to out gain ^{them} in every ~~direction~~. The War economy was hindered production was essentially inefficient to a strong extent due to lack of Raw materials, the chaotic structure of Nazi regime, ^{lack of} ^{harbour} and Mistakes by Goering. Even with the appointment of Speer they were still hindered.

The lack of B. raw materials greatly hindered Nazi war production. Germany essential materials such coal and oil in comparison to their enemies. Allied bombing made matters ~~or~~ worse. The allies strategically bombed Germany's industrial areas causing the lack of raw material to increase, leading inefficient in war production. Even when the Nazis ~~or~~ quickly conquered ~~countries~~ ^{cities} in ~~Factor~~ & Russia due to Stalin

(Section A continued) scorched Earth policy, they found more no materials to use them. This factor enabled the allies to produce more weapons allowing Germany to pushed back. War production was greatly inefficient due to the lack of ~~the~~ raw materials.

However the appointment of Speer did increase efficiency ~~and~~ in terms war production. With the appointment of Speer production efficiency enhanced. Speer created a central planning board to collectively co-ordinate production better. Indeed this ~~early~~ was shown through results. Tank production increased by 25%, ammunition increased by 97% and total war production increased 59%. However despite these vast improvements the Germany was still outproduced by the allies. With the appointment of Speer war production efficiency went better but was still not enough to change the course of war.



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

This response to question 3 was given a high level 3 mark. It shows an understanding of the question and attempts to link material to the question in order to analyse the efficiency of war production. However, this is not always convincing or made fully relevant. The answer is more secure when it moves onto improvements under Speer.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

Ensure all points are clearly relevant to the question, and that you can use them to develop an analysis, as candidates will sometimes attempt to write about everything they studied on that section of the course. Planning an answer gives time to think through points.

Question 3

This was the less popular choice and it produced a range of responses. Whilst there were some candidates who were able to evaluate the degree to which British actions were confused and had disastrous consequences, responses did suggest some seemed to have limited knowledge of the Abyssinian invasion, subsequent issues and indeed British policy towards Italy across the period. Commonly discussed issues included the Hoare-Laval pact and the subsequent fallout, the role of the League of Nations linked to collective security and the Britain's wider relations and dealings with Italy, including reference to the Stresa Front. Some candidates considered that this was arguably confused. In addition, links were made between the Rome-Berlin Axis of 1936 and Italy and the League of Nations in 1937. Critical debate was given to both of the terms 'confused' and 'disastrous', and stronger answers often demonstrated a clear appreciation that there could be a counter-argument emphasising the complex nature of Mussolini's foreign policy and general developments in international relations, although some responses were let down by limited knowledge, errors over what action Britain and/or the League took, or attempts to broaden the question at the expense of focus on the specific question.

It can widely be agreed with the judgements made that Britain's handling of the Abyssinian crisis was confused and ultimately disastrous. Britain did not take any decisive action against Mussolini, instead acting through the League of Nations. This was disastrous, as the league failed to impose effective sanctions on Italy to prevent the takeover of Abyssinia in 1936. Britain did not achieve successful appeasement, as they did not accept Mussolini's conquest, so still agitated the dictator. This drove him closer to Hitler, breaking down existing Anglo-Italian relationships. The peace ballot that was conducted at the time, suggested that many Britons would support firm action against Italy in Abyssinia, including military action if necessary. However, Britain was not in the correct military or economic state to provide military resources to a foreign campaign. It can therefore be argued that Britain's handling of the Abyssinian crisis was confused and ultimately disastrous.

The League of Nations was widely supported in British society. The League of Nations Union was established shortly after its establishment in 1918. The British viewed the league as an alternative to rearmament, using it as a vehicle to justify disarmament. However, the rise of the aggressive dictators

(Section A continued) undermined this policy. In 1935, when Italy declared its interest in an invasion of Abyssinia, Britain remained relatively quiet over the proposals. This led to Mussolini initially, and falsely, believing that Britain would condone a campaign. However, this was not to be. The ruling emperor of Abyssinia, Selassie, appealed to the League to help Abyssinia. Italy claimed that the invasion was a result of Abyssinian aggression on Italian border countries. The League sided with Abyssinia, outraging Mussolini. However, the action taken was largely ineffective. The League placed sanctions against all imports, and some exports, to Italy. It was hoped that economic pressure would drive Mussolini to negotiation. However, these sanctions were largely ineffective, as the US continued to trade with Italy. The US never joined the League, so was not obliged to abide by its terms. Britain failed to influence effective League action against the aggressor. The LON lost its credibility, so Britain had failed to enforce the policy of mutual assistance. Italy fell to Abyssinia fell to aggressive Italian takeover; the League had failed. This supports the judgement that Britain's handling of the Abyssinian crisis was confused and ultimately disastrous, as they failed to initially take decisive action against Mussolini's plan, and did not use the League effectively, resulting in severe repercussions for the future.



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

The response shows good knowledge and has an overall focus. There is a clear analytical structure, although sometimes the focus is not as direct or evaluative as would be expected at the higher levels. This was given a secure level 4 mark.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

Where a question has two aspects, such as the 'confused' and 'disastrous' references in this, it is important to try to focus on and develop both of these. Very good analysis may make distinctions between the extents of change for these two issues within the same point.

Question 4

This was the more popular choice for candidates in Option D2. Most candidates knew about the main issues and arguments about Britain's early war efforts, covering a range of issues such as the period of the Battle of Britain, the fall of France and Normandy, the Norwegian campaign, the Battle of Atlantic, North Africa and the Mediterranean, with treatment broadly in that order. A minority were a little too narrow, focusing almost exclusively on a single issue such as the Battle of Britain. Some candidates were less secure on the Mediterranean, or lost sight of the issue of Britain's conduct when examining the likes of the fall of France.

Some students did drift beyond the timeframe into issues such as the strategic bombing campaign and/or D Day. Generally speaking, candidates did not struggle to include detail and statistics to support answers, and few lapsed into pure narrative of events. At the higher end, responses were able to explore the extent of success and failure, setting particular examples in context, with astute arguments being made over issues like the importance of maintaining the benevolent neutrality of the USA in the early years of the war. Stronger responses were those who were able to go beyond seeing the above named issues as separate, exploring their interrelationship and weighing Britain's overall conduct.

(Section A continued) had truly been fought. Thus, the union of Churchill, the Army and the RAF meant that their conduct of the war in Dunkirk could be considered a success.

However, we could also argue that Dunkirk was a major strategic failure, where British conduct of the war resulted in their failure and the German takeover of France. Firstly, the military played an important role in conducting a failed offensive in France.

Firstly, the fact that the British had failed to predict German movement across the Ardennes, meant that the area was unprotected by the Maginot line.

Thus, British and French troops found themselves on the defensive retreat. Even though military leaders had planned an attack to outflank the Germans advancing the Ardennes, the failure to direct commands resulted in British failure of the conduct of the war. In addition, German Blitzkrieg tactics resulted in British troops being surrounded, cut off from

supply bases and troops. It is evident that Britain lost control of the situation in France. This resulted in the loss of armaments, ammunition and oil - invaluable resources needed for the war. Not only did Hitler succeed in achieving France, but he also gained British military supplies. This presented an almighty failure in the British conduct of

(Section A continued) the war. We could argue that the 'Dunkirk spirit' was simply used to disguise the apparent failure of the British conduct of the war. It was not a military success as had been presented but showed that the army was unable to cope with a potential surprise attack ~~to~~ from the Germans. Thus, British conduct of the war was ~~an~~ obviously a ~~failure~~ failure, losing them their only ally at the time.

Furthermore, we could argue that during the years 1939-41 the British conduct of the war was both a success and failure. Early advances in both ~~to~~ Greece and ~~the USSR~~ and the Mediterranean could be viewed as successful. British troops managed to successfully land on Greece and push the enemy backwards. However, British conduct of the war became a failure with the intervention of German forces. The Wehrmacht caused the retreat of British troops from Greece into Crete. Hitler was then able to capture 50,000

British troops - POW - on Crete. This presented a major failure in the British conduct of the war. It showed that they were incapable of dealing with the threat of the Germans. Although Greece had proved an initial success; British failure to establish and justify themselves on Greece resulted.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This response to question 4 was awarded a mark in level 5. It is focused, evaluative, balanced, and has good range. It uses knowledge to develop arguments carefully, reaching judgements on issues throughout.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

If you have a particularly strong view on a question, it is worth remembering the need for balance. This does not mean sitting on the fence, more that you should explore the range of alternatives.

Question 5

The extent to which the decisions made by Germany's leaders responsible for the outbreak of the First World War proved to be a popular question. There were many good responses within the higher levels, and many candidates displayed good knowledge of relevant events and policies such as Weltpolitik and Flottenpolitik. In terms of decisions made by Germany's leaders, knowledge of the Kaiser's role was generally good, and many answers showed a good understanding of Bethmann Hollweg's role. Detailed knowledge of other individuals, such as Tirpitz and Moltke, was less common. There was also considerable references to historians other than those in the given sources – most obviously Fischer, but also but also numerous others, such as Wehler and other German historians, Taylor and Niall Ferguson to name a few. In the main, candidates taking such a historiographical approach could do so with some degree of success, going beyond simply naming and starting to explore their arguments in the light of the question and given evidence. However, there were responses which seemed intent on naming historians, possibly from previous examinations, with limited thought as to how these related to the specific question and sources. In terms of general focus, this was also a discriminating factor between the middle and upper levels. Many candidates put forward sound arguments over the general responsibility, whereas the best were able to offer more precision with regards the decisions made by Germany's leaders. This was also evident in the use of the sources; for example, whilst candidates largely saw Source 3 as pointing to factors other than German responsibility, Source 3 was effectively utilised by some candidates in order to explore extent to which the July Crisis, and indeed earlier events, were to a degree outside the control of the German elite.

(Section B continued) German leaders were primarily responsible for the provocation of war, which led to increasing international tensions and a tense tight alliance system that was also partly responsible for the first world war, as it made a Balkan war into a general European war.

However, Hewitson also agrees ^{this did not mean} German leaders planned for war but rather continued a policy of "Bismarckian" ~~German~~ This also implicates other nations as well because it takes two to play a game of Bismarckian. Therefore Source 1, while challenging Source 3 in that it places much more emphasis on Germany, also corroborates that nationalism in other countries may also have been a factor, albeit a minor one.

Yet I believe this strand of the interpretation is less backed by historical evidence. Other nations did try to back out of brinkmanship, as evidenced by the British frantically arranging peace talks during the July Crisis. Even the Kaiser himself called Serbia's response to the ultimatum "humble" and "a capitulation." However, Germany and Austria (arguably pushed by Germany) did not back down at these capitulations either. Therefore, while Nationalism created the tensions, only in German leaders did it actually result in war.

(Section B continued) Secondly, there is evidence that German leaders did indeed plan a war. Fischer's interpretation of the September programme of 1914, which describes making "Belgium a vassal state" and "France economically dependent on Germany", is that it is so detailed that it must have been pre-existing war aims. However, historians such as Niall Ferguson dispute this. Secondly, the "War Council" of 1912 ~~seem~~^{agreed} increased surveillance on Russian mobilisation, crucial in the context of the Schlieffen plan, where Russian mobilisation lines played a huge part, and. At this meeting, Admiral Toppitz also stated "In a year and a half the great fight shall be upon us." General von Moltke said "war... the sooner, the better." This is significant evidence German leaders were actively detailing out pushing for war, if not

completely planning it. Therefore, it was "Dinstat de
Iner polibili" ^{and} perhaps "Abwehr" that motivated
German provocations, not Brinkmanship and
mean the leaders of Germany were primarily
responsible for the First World War, with the
context of the alliance system also being
significant, and nationalism ^{among other powers} contributing to war
tensions, but not directly war itself.

To conclude, contrary to Noma

(Section B continued)

Stone's argument in Source 3, Sources
1 and 2, as well as my own knowledge,
corroborate and indicate that decisions made by
German leaders were primarily responsible for the
First World War. Source 2 and Source 3,
do however corroborate ~~with~~ my, backed by my own
knowledge, that the context of the alliance system
was also greatly important in ensuring the war's
escalation, and Source 2 ventures it may have
motivated German leaders through Abwehr, although this
is inconclusive. Finally, while Source 1 and Source
3 place nationalism in other powers to be a factor,
in varying extents, my own knowledge and
interpretation believes it did not directly lead to
war, only war tensions. Therefore, the decisions by
German leaders led, to a large extent, to the
First World War, but must also be placed in
the significant context of the alliance system.

(Page 16) Austria's

* Serbia's General Habsburgs also ^{proposed} ~~wanted~~ war on Serbia 25 times between 1906 and 1914 due to nationalism

J (Page 17). (b) Germany's role in the naval



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

The response has a clear and confident focus on both the question and the views taken on this in the given extracts. It examines these, assimilating evidence from own knowledge, to offer reasoned evaluation on the strengths of the given arguments. Such a response is typical of a level 5 for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

Set out the arguments in the introduction, emphasising the position that the different sources take in relation to the question and each other.

Question 6

This was the less popular of the two controversy questions for Option D1, although it was attempted by over 1/3 of candidates. There were also many good answers, with sound knowledge and effective use of sources. The sources were generally understood well. There was, however, some misunderstanding. For example, the phrase in Source 4, 'many felt their existence threatened by a succession of crises' was taken by some candidates to mean that people were being threatened by the Nazis. Also, some candidates took brief excerpts from sources without seeing the wider context, such as focusing only on the latter aspects of 'The Fuhrer cult was as much in the eye of the beholder as in the tricks of Goebbels' propaganda apparatus', and so ignoring the significance of the first half of the sentence. As such, it is worth reiterating that candidates who undertake a close reading of the evidence and interpret evidence in the context it is given, stand the best chance of offering effective analysis. With this, candidates with a more extensive knowledge and deeper understanding were better placed to explore issues raised in context, as opposed to those who simply identify references to concentration camps or terror and use this as a starting point to offer rehearsed examples without exploring how this relates to the debate in the question. That said, many responses reached Level 4 and above, in part through a conscious emphasis on the ways in which the sources provided different views/interpretations linked to the debate. Many candidates recognised the key issues within the different sources. The Hitler Myth was generally quite well understood – many candidates had a good understanding of Kershaw's arguments beyond those expressed in source 5. Many candidates effectively drew a distinction between feelings towards Hitler personally and the Nazi Party as a whole. A few recognised that people's political views and feelings about a repressive state might be difficult to discern, for obvious reasons. Some candidates did begin to wander away from the question in applying own knowledge though, most commonly by (a) excessive reference to the years beyond 1939 and (b) consideration of anti-Semitic policy with limited regard to the question.

Plan: ① was - "Faith in Furrer", propoganda, demigod
 Sz "Propoganda. Hitle myfn.

Now ~~within the years 1933-39~~ There has been much debate over whether the Nazi regime 1933-39 was genuinely popular as source 4 suggests since the public had, "faith in the Kaiser" due to his portrayal in Propoganda evident in both sources 4 and 5. While source 4 ~~clearly~~ suggests that the population wholly believed in Hitler, and ~~was~~ Kershaw demonstrates that a minority showed discontent demonstrating that popularity was not widespread but was not total rejection. In contrast source 6 ~~is~~ takes the view of the use of terror ~~is~~ to generate popularity through "concentration camps" and the SS suggesting that popularity may not be genuine but due to coercion. ~~is~~ In general it is difficult to determine whether popularity in the third Reich was genuine as suggested predominantly in sources 4 and 5 or as a result of terror and ~~coercion~~ coercion in source 6. However it has been found that the use of terror was in fact limited and therefore this supports

(Section B continued) that Hitler played a minimal role and therefore ~~it~~ people genuinely supported the Nazi regime.

Firstly ~~source~~ Burleigh in source 4 places great emphasis on popularity for the regime being genuine since the population had "faith in the Führer", meaning they placed their unconditional support in their leader. He suggests that this faith was predominantly a result of the portrayal of Hitler demonstrated by "Goebbels' propaganda apparatus", ~~the~~ portraying Hitler as a demigod by giving him, "properties he manifestly lacked" as seen in Leni Riefenstahl's ~~the~~ Triumph of The Will (1935). This portrayal would have led to the beliefs of Hitler as invincible and ~~an~~ omnipotent thus suggesting that they put all of their faith in him and therefore there was genuine support. In addition to the God-like portrayal, as Kershaw shows, Hitler ~~was also~~ the "achievements" of the regime were "attributable to Hitler himself", thus meaning that Hitler was linked to policies to ensure they went unquestioned and therefore providing genuine popularity. Kershaw is renowned for his establishment of the idea notion of the 'Hitler myth' by ~~the~~ which Hitler, as seen in source 1, was depicted as an omnipotent Führer and all aspects of life depicted this from his powerful ability to move

(Section B continued) speeches to ~~was~~ saluting him he was seen as a demigod and therefore the public had to give their full and genuine support and he was undoubtedly correct. Kershaw's Hitler myth therefore explains why the "murders of late June 1934" at the Night of the Long Knives where between 800 - 2000 men were killed were easily availed ~~as they were~~ ~~politically~~ ~~no~~ since Hitler was always right in his actions. This therefore implies that there was genuine support for the regime.

Now Moreover unlike in source 4, Kershaw acknowledges the mild discontent due to "everyday grievances" over "social and economic conditions" thus ~~is~~ suggesting that although Hitler was depicted as, "without sin" (source 5) there was ~~no~~ ~~minor~~ not wholehearted support as people did not fully agree with the conditions ~~in~~ in which they lived. Historians ~~are~~ disagree over this discontent with some, such as Malmann and Paul, suggesting that discontent with social conditions and therefore non-comity was 'loyal reluctance' meaning they were indifferent to politics so continued with their own way of life in the *kleiner Sachlichkeit* fashion perhaps wearing make up or listening to jazz music. On the other hand historians such as Broszat see the same actions as deliberate non-conformity to Nazi ideals

(Section B continued) ~~SS~~ in order to oppose and weaken the regime, ~~suggesting~~ ~~the~~ which is known as ~~the~~ 'resistance' and suggests that popularity was not widespread and certainly not genuine as source 4 suggests. Kershaw in source 5 takes a ~~more~~ stance similar to Malmann and ~~Paul~~ Paul, stating that the grievances, "by no means necessarily signified total rejection of Nazism", demonstrating that though popularity may not have been wholehearted, it was genuine and there remained major support.

In contrast to sources 4 and 5 Wachsmann takes an alternative stance suggesting that terror played as opposed to propaganda ~~was~~ was key in developing support. He suggests that there were "23 000 ~~prison~~ political prisoners" by the end of June 1935 and a "handful of SS concentration camps", such as Dachau established in 1933. The use of terror apparatus in contrast to, ~~political~~ "propaganda apparatus" (source 4) suggests that people were ~~not~~ not genuinely supportive but were supportive as a result of coercion. This is demonstrated by the fact that, "detainees inside prisons declared: as resistance fell" demonstrating that people ~~did~~ refrained from opposition due to fear. The Gestapo and SD ~~was~~ controlled by Himmler played a large role



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

This response to question 6 was given level 5 for both assessment objectives. It offered a strong assessment of the debate over the popularity of Hitler and the Nazis, making thorough use of the three sources and own knowledge. These first four pages demonstrate this; the candidate offers a balanced analysis, which weighs issues with reasoned arguments and judgements that are firmly linked to a detailed analysis of the evidence the sources give.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

Be careful over trying to fit the views of any historian or 'school' you have studied to the specific sources or question in front of you. Study the sources carefully and critically, and work out exactly how these relate to the arguments you are considering.

Question 7

This was the more popular of question in Option D2, and candidates produced a range of responses. In the main candidates seemed to understand and make good use of the sources, with varying degrees of success and depth of own knowledge that was applied to the debate. The question focus and content of the sources meant that candidates tended to focus primarily on Munich, although stronger responses were well able to bring in relevant material on a range of issues, such as the Anschluss, British fears over bombing, attitudes to Germany's desire to see treaty revision and the relative preparedness for war of both nations. Those who could securely link the wider context tended to be the most successful. For example, some offered valid material regarding the Peace ballot, but struggled to convincingly shape this to the question. Most candidates were able to develop the debate within and between the sources, with sources 7 and 8 in particular being used in varied ways, and candidates seemed comfortable with the focus on misjudgement. This controversy still tends to produce a higher proportion of responses which, all other things being equal, lack balance, more often than not in condemning Chamberlain. Stronger responses explored alternatives before reaching judgement, and tended to do so by going beyond a simple balance sheet of arguments for and against. Instead they took those of the points they had prepared which were most relevant to the specific debate and explored these in more depth, alongside the evidence offered within the sources.

(Section B continued) face opposition towards his policy of appeasement. Churchill and his supporters would especially argue that Chamberlain was ignorant of German ambitions and that his policies were severely misjudged. Chamberlain also faced heavy criticism from Labour ~~MPs~~ MPs and the media. Papers such as the Daily Herald and Worker were also quick to criticise his policy of appeasement. We could agree that his decision was a misjudgement as the agreements made at the Munich conference did not maintain peace. Even Chamberlain himself was seen to ~~be~~ imply that he was unsure that the agreement had secured German cooperation. Thus rearmament was seen to increase.

Furthermore, we could argue that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was not misjudged. Source 8 highlights that although Britain entered into agreements with Germany they were 'limited' and were possibly an acknowledgement of the harshness of Versailles. We could agree with source 8, that Chamberlain's policy was not a misjudgement as the majority of the British nation believed that Germany had been treated harshly during the Versailles settlement. Thus, the source argues that this justified Chamberlain's decision to follow a policy of appeasement. It was

(Section B continued) Not misjudged as he believed that reducing some of the terms of the treaty could result in a peaceful settlement. In addition, the fact that Czechoslovakia was considered an 'artificial state' consisting of numerous minorities would have added to this idea that Hitler had every right to claim the Sudetenland. Thus, the source 8 only emphasises the fact that in 1938 Hitler's requests were not totally unreasonable. He demanded territory that arguably consisted of German speaking people. In addition the fact that the Sudeten Deutsche Partei had considerable support emphasised this idea that a policy of appeasement was not misjudged. Chamberlain saw the benefits of having Hitler onside.

It was not fully understood in 1932 that Hitler would continue to achieve total domination of Europe. Thus, we could agree with source 2, as Chamberlain could be praised for his optimistic outlook. At the time revision of the treaty appeared possible. It is also apparent that Hitler had not made all his intentions clear.

In conclusion, although source 7 and to some extent source 9 would argue that Chamberlain was somewhat naive or moronic to follow a policy of appeasement it did

(Section B continued) appear that in 1938 Britain had very few options. Chamberlain's decision was not a misjudgement as source 7 and 8 suggest, he faced considerable pressure to act in a way that would please both Britain and Hitler. Chamberlain was merely the figure-head behind the policy of appeasement and he did not misjudge the overall anti-war atmosphere at the time. Ultimately, it was not the correct time to risk war with Germany and the revision of the Treaty of Versailles still appeared hopeful. Thus, how can we state that his actions to follow a policy of appeasement were fully misjudged when Britain was unprepared to risk the consequences of alternative options, such as the threat of war (which Hitler himself had suggested he was not prepared to ignite in 1938).



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This was the conclusion to a response which was well-reasoned and detailed. A balanced analysis of the debate was offered, with confident analysis of the sources and clear integration of own knowledge. The candidate was able to apply precise knowledge to examine appropriate issues, and thus reached into level 5 for AO1. The development of the sources did not quite have the same level of depth and evaluation, and was thus awarded level 4.



ResultsPlus


Examiner Tip

When planning your answer, read through the sources carefully as well as all of the arguments, issues and evidence you can. This will help you to cross-reference and analyse effectively in your answer.

Question 8

This question, which required consideration of the nature and extent of attempts to improve the British economy at the end of the war, was the least popular for candidates entering option D2.

However, in the strongest scripts there was engagement in key aspects of the debate. There was consideration of post-war reconstruction linked to utilisation of Source 10 and, to a lesser degree, Source 11. The sources were well used, with competent cross-referencing and analysis. Knowledge was generally sound, with detailed statistics on issues such as productivity and US loans, and many candidates were able to make good use of the arguments of historians, most notably Corelli Barnett. Where candidates were less successful, it tended to be because of one or more of the following issues: (a) a failure to focus on key aspects of the question, such as 'lost' or 'how far', (b) drift to consideration of the Second World War in a manner of limited relevance to the question or (c) where a number of examples were relatively one-sided. That said, many displayed effective cross-referencing, confident analysis, integration of sources and own knowledge and evaluation.



At the end of the war, the British economy needed to be improved in the sense that it needed to switch from a wartime economy back to peacetime, but it also needed to recover ~~after~~ and improve after becoming reliant on America due to the lend lease agreement, and importing

(Section B continued) around '1/5 of food needs from America. Glynn and Booth claim that 'post-war Britain was undeniably the best opportunity'⁽¹⁰⁾ to improve the British economy, but 'the chance was lost' (10). Similarly, Lloyd suggests that far from improving, ~~British~~ British industry 'fell into bad habits' (11) and as a result, the 'Germans and Japanese... did not find it too hard to win customers away from the British' (11). These ^{views} contrasts to Gamble, who acknowledges the 'difficulties'⁽¹²⁾ of switching back to peacetime production, but suggests these problems were 'overcome with assistance from the United States' (12) and meant that reconstruction of the British economy was a 'success' (12). Overall, the fact that rationing continued into the 1950s, and Labour's welfare state was only delivered after American aid suggests that Glynn and Booth, and Lloyd are correct in suggesting that the chance was lost to improve the British economy after the war.

In Source 10, Glynn and Booth clearly state that 'post-war Britain was undeniably the best opportunity' (10) to improve the British economy, but suggest that the 'chance was lost' (10) due to a combination of factors, ranging from Labour's policy of 'nationalisation, planning and an anti-monopoly policy' (10) but also due to the trade unions' 'power to block changes' (10), which would have

(Section B continued) prevented modernisation, which was desperately needed, as Marr described Britain's industry after the war as being 'cloaked' in ^{the} 19th century. Glynn and Booth, who also claim 'plans for radical industrial reform were bunted by opposition from industrialists' (10) are supported by Lloyd, who ~~blames~~ suggests that industrialists were to blame for a lack of improvement in the British economy as 'they fell into bad habits' (11) and as a result missed an 'excellent opportunity to secure new export markets' (11). This contrasts to the arguments made by Gamble, who suggests that after 'assistance from the United States' (12), ^{the} British economy did improve, with 'the export gap closed' (12). However, the fact that Britain relied on the United States aid, in the form of a \$3.75 billion loan at 2% interest in 1945 and then aid from the Marshall Plan between 1948-51, suggests that Britain did lose the 'best opportunity' (10) to improve by instead becoming reliant on America, ~~evidenced by~~ supported by the fact that the NHS, promised in Labour's 1945 manifesto, * was only delivered in 1948 once Marshall aid payments had begun.

* could not be supported by the British economy and

In source 11, Lloyd suggests that 'England had an excellent opportunity to secure new export markets' (11)

* but lost this chance by falling into 'bad habits' (11).

(Section B continued) because 'Germany and Japan were too shattered by the war to compete' (11). * Glynn and Booth support this, by suggesting that Britain should have exploited ~~(exploited) (its)~~ ^{its} 'head start over its continental rivals' (10) that had been damaged by the war. Yet in 1945, Britain was only exporting around 1/5 of its export levels before the war, in contrast to Lloyd who suggests 'British exporters... were successful at least for a time' (11) in their 'efforts' (11) to 'secure new export markets' (11).

~~Lloyd~~ Whilst Lloyd suggests Britain lost the chance to improve the economy through slipping into 'bad habits' (11) and ~~allowing~~ enabling the Germans and Japanese to 'win customers away from the British' (11), Gamble suggests that Britain was successful in improving the economy through greater exports as 'Britain still accounted for 25% of exports of world manufacturers in 1951.' (12) Gamble credits this to the continuation of 'wartime regulation' (12) which he suggests controlled the trade unions, who accepted 'wage restraint(s)' (12). This directly contrasts to Glynn and Booth who suggests trade unions had too much power and had been 'drawn into the making and execution of production policy' (10) and thus enabled trade unions to 'block changes' (10) that would have improved the British economy after the war. Glynn and Booth are supported by Correll Barnett, who suggests that trade unions enjoyed too much power.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This response demonstrates a clear focus, confidently examining the given views. There is careful cross-referencing of evidence from the sources, with well integrated own knowledge, all of which are used to develop an analysis of aspects of the controversy. Evaluative judgements are offered, and whilst at times the depth of these could go further, this was seen as a clear level 5 response for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

Be careful over trying to fit the views of any historian or viewpoint you have studied to the specific sources or question in front of you. Study the sources carefully and critically, and work out exactly how these relate to the arguments you are considering.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

In-Depth Study question

- Candidates must provide more factual details.
- Candidates need to ensure their subject knowledge conforms to the specification. Weaker responses usually lacked range and/or depth of analysis.
- Stay within the specific boundaries of the question – for example, some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods.
- Candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- In order to address the question more effectively, candidates need to offer an analysis not provide a descriptive or chronological account. However, many candidates produced answers, which were focused and developed appropriately.
- Some candidates need to analyse key phrases and concepts more carefully.
- Some candidates could have explored links and the interaction between issues more effectively.
- Conclusions were sometimes basic summaries rather than offering an explicit judgment linked to the analytical demands of the question. The importance of conclusions that are explicit rather than implicit is emphasised. Indeed, it was fairly rare to find an answer for Section A especially, that was not of Level 4 quality overall if there were effective, considered introductions and conclusions.

Associated Historical Controversy question

- It is suggested that the students who perform best on Section B tended to be those who read the sources carefully, accurately and critically; recognised themes and issues arising from the sources, then used these to address the question. Some candidates potentially limited themselves by closing off potential areas of enquiry by seeking to make the evidence of the sources fit the contention in the question without full thought to the issues within the sources, or by using the sources to illustrate arguments without relating evidence to other sources or own knowledge.
- Candidates need to treat the sources as a package to facilitate cross-referencing and advance a convincing line of argument. Many weaker candidates resorted to 'potted' summaries of each source which failed to develop a support/challenge approach.
- Candidates need to integrate the source material and their own knowledge more effectively to substantiate a particular view. Some candidates could have explored links and interaction more effectively between own knowledge and the sources. Weaker responses were frequently too reliant on the sources provided and little or no own knowledge was included.
- Some needed to develop their points with more specific factual details.
- Some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods, especially for Q6.
- Candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- Candidates should avoid memorised 'perspectives' essays and base their responses on the issues raised by the sources instead. The Associated Historical Controversy question is an exercise in interpretation not historiography.

- That said, there were very few really weak responses. The impression was that the substance of the source at least enabled candidates offer some development and supporting evidence. In such cases though, candidates often struggled to extend issues with own knowledge, or really analyse the given views.
- There was also a correlation between those candidates who reviewed all sources in their opening paragraph and high performance. Whilst a telling introduction is not essential, the process of carefully studying the sources to ascertain how they relate to the statement in the question, prior to writing the main analysis, allows candidates to clarify and structure their arguments.
- Overall for the Associated Historical Controversy question, there was not always enough use of sources in combination. Some answers are still following a source by source approach with some cross-referencing in places. Some other answers tend to be a quote from the source then relevant own knowledge with analysis. More candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively to produce responses which are analysis led. Evaluation of argument is also an area which could be developed in Part B, particularly in terms of relating judgements back to those in the given sources.

Grade Boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

<http://www.edexcel.com/iwantto/Pages/grade-boundaries.aspx>

Ofqual



Llywodraeth Cynulliad Cymru
Welsh Assembly Government



Pearson Education Limited. Registered company number 872828
with its registered office at Edinburgh Gate, Harlow, Essex CM20 2JE