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Examiners' Report
June 2011

GCE History 6HI03 D

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Introduction

This was the second time that this specification has been examined, and judging by the feedback from centres and student responses on the examination, centres and candidates seem increasingly assured of what is expected of them. As with last year, the paper appears to have worked in the sense that all candidates were able to attempt answers to both parts of the examination, whilst the most able were stretched appropriately.

The paper requires candidates to answer two questions (a Depth Study question and an Associated Historical Controversy question) in 120 minutes. Whilst the length of responses varied between candidates, there was no evidence of a lack of sufficient time to complete thorough responses. Thankfully, very few candidates approached questions by attempting to include everything they knew about the option, with the vast majority managing selection and focus in responding to questions.

Across both sections, responses continue to demonstrate that planning and structure are crucial in shaping effective responses. Whilst a small minority seemed to over plan, at times producing detailed plans of two or more pages and seemingly at the expense of substantial answers, the trend continues that relatively brief but focused plans help organise thoughts and use of material.

One issue that did appear to distinguish quality responses was effective use and consideration of key terms and concepts, both directly from questions, sources and in general writing from own knowledge. Candidates who had an assured grasp of such words were able to explore these effectively within the question, such as the issue of 'effective government' (question 1) or 'serious opposition' (question 2) below. At times this also appeared to link to how careful a reading of the question had been made, such as with the issue of a 'general European war' (question 5, below). There were also a small minority who did not appear to fully understand issues central to questions they selected, such as the 'Weimar Constitution' (question 1, below). Whilst this may be down to selection of a preferred topic regardless of the specific analytical demands of the question, preference borne out of preparation for only a limited number of topics or candidates not reading a question thoroughly, such responses are unlikely to attain the higher levels.

In section A and to some extent B, candidates should be aware of the varying forms that questions may take. Some candidates demonstrated a tendency to attempt to open up questions to consider all possible related factors. Candidates were able to do this successfully by relating material back to the issue at hand, such as to qualify the extent of significance. However, a minority of candidates brought in information of some relevance, but were essentially attempting to answer questions different from those set.

As far as an issue raised last time in section B, fewer candidates spent time considering issues such as the reliability of a source, in terms of the date when the extract was written, or in terms of the title of the book from which it was taken. An increasing number of strong responses had a well informed grasp of the historiographical debate. Whilst it is not a requirement to bring in knowledge of named historians, many did so effectively. A small minority did so without full thought as to how this related to the specific demands of the questions and the given extracts, and thus were less successful in this respect. Generally speaking, candidates who sought to identify the arguments the given extracts made relating to the questions and examine these, integrating their own knowledge into a focused discussion, often cross-referencing the sources, performed well. Beyond this, candidates who explored the more subtle nuances offered and applied selected knowledge to analyse the views and offer reasoned judgements reached the highest levels.

(Section A continued) handicapped effective government as ~~handicapped~~ Hindenburg, the president, attempted to ~~stop~~ ~~abolish~~ the Social Democratic Party government, and so amended Article 48, which not only disrupted the life of parliament but meant that compromise brought about little desirable change. Indeed, in the period between 1919 and 1933, there were 21 conservative governments with the one just lasting little over 18 months.

Article 54 of the constitution also established that the judiciary could interpret laws. However, those responsible for maintaining and improving the effectiveness of the constitution were conservatives who favoured a return to monarchy or some form of authoritarian rule. This affected the responsiveness of government. For example, Hitler's short ~~5~~^{Five} year sentence, only to be reinstated ~~at~~ well before the time after committed treason in the form of the failed Munich Beer hall Putsch shows how sympathetic the conservatives in civil service, the judiciary and education were sympathetic to authoritarianism. With this in mind, I will assess other significant factors which also had a significant impact on the effectiveness of government, and I will also attempt to assess this in light of the constitution.

The Treaty of Versailles (Versailles), greatly resented as a source of embarrassment with its terms and conditions upon the German people, who in turn expressed their anger towards the government, and threatened

(Section A continued) Stability Its reparations of 6500 million to be paid to the Inter Allied Reparations Committee were unworkable, and increased Germany with a huge debt. Its restriction of Army numbers (100,000), ~~as~~ exemption from aircraft, tanks, guns, tanks and the repatriation of Alsace Lorraine → the German industrial carbo steel not only disrupted economic output, but polarised German attitudes. ~~by~~ The November Criminals, promulgated Hitler, and committed an act tantamount to treason which suggests that those in government who oversaw the changes, through Versailles, and that the Weimar constitution, was the biggest threat to stability for the German government.

There was also considerable opposition during these periods which affected the business of Government. The extreme left political parties such as the KPD, though being disillusioned by the ^{Bersteinian} ~~Marxist~~ revolution, not only argued for a violent Marxist revolution but disrupted heavy industry through demonstrations, strikes and acts of sabotage. ~~which culminated~~, perhaps Bavaria too and the Sudetenland sought independence = all of which strained the ~~was~~ already burdened balance of Government. Versailles highlighted that the Reichstag was bereft of means to reject a catastrophic peace. The Kapp Putsch, also symbolised a weak government without Army support as the Freikorps marched. This political opposition, together with the Pan German League, the Fatherland party and the

(Section A continued) agenda of the 'freedom law' greatly ^{appealed} ~~affected~~ the legitimacy of the government. As ^{appreciated} ~~appreciated~~, France-Belgium occupation of the Ruhr ^{boosted} economic output which increased unemployment. The policy of passive resistance attributed in part to the period of the 'Crisis Inflation' which was a result of inherited ~~mis~~ mismanagement during the war, and lack of taxation which heavily soured the German mood for the post-war government.

The Wall Street Crash also affected successive governments in this period. Acts of sabotage, and the growth of fringe parties who purged members of the government also affected its legitimacy and effectiveness as it created a climate of fear. The different political platforms, ~~to~~ of the DDP, ZP - largely Catholic, DNVP, and the SPD - (whom were for the most part reluctant to entertain government) were seen as a way to overthrow the government as the only consensus lay in the already pre-determined Foreign policy → ~~to~~ (Versailles - no ~~article~~ ~~article~~ ~~article~~ forbidden).

~~However, In the~~

On the other hand, there were some successes on the part of individuals in the government, despite the difficult working environment. The Dawes plan ushered in five years of economic growth, and heavy industry by 1929, returned to 1913 levels. There was also heavy investment in infrastructure due to the

(Section A continued) cartels and government firms which brought about a period of prosperity emphasised through the cultural expression of the Weimar Citizens. Women also entered into the civil service and enjoyed greater freedoms. More so, 300 000 new houses were built during this period to house the booming nation. However, high birth rates would be a long term problem for the government who lack the means of continuing to meet demand.

As I have demonstrated, the nature of the Weimar Constitution, and its clauses that came associated with it such as the Versailles treaty with its 'warrior guilt clause' (Article 231), would to some extent ~~highlight~~ handicap the effectiveness of government. However, other pre-existing challenges such as anti-republicanism and the red threat, the ~~great~~ ever fluctuating economic period set a problem for a government that failed itself to achieve consensus - as seen through the various governments in 1919 - 1923. In a sense, the Weimar Constitution encapsulated the ~~lack of~~ collective feeling because it was imposed - which suggests that it handicapped the government.



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Examiner Comments

This is a structured response which clearly sets out the factors it intends to deal with from the start. The response develops a range of issues using selected own knowledge. It also maintains a firm focus on the issue of debate.



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Examiner Tip

Where relevant, trying to 'weigh up' the relative importance of different arguments and issues build towards a strong overall conclusion.

Question 2

There were some very strong responses on this question. Overall there was generally better coverage of the Stauffenberg bomb plot and the youth movements, and some excellent coverage of the Red Orchestra, the *Kreisau Circle* and the Church, although the latter was almost exclusively the Catholic Church. A number of candidates did offer responses which dealt largely or partly with events before 1939. Whilst aspects of this may have proved useful in establishing context, responses which dwelled on generalised issues struggled to attain the higher levels. Some responses attempted to interpret Jews as an opposition group, with obvious limitations to this argument. Reasoning was often given over why opposition did or did not constitute being serious, with many effective answers offering relative evaluation considering the varying context the different groups operated in across the time period.

Church, left, right, Youth, Army all put down.
Reasoning had no real power, Hitler had made other party's weaker but there
was still some Alliance with Church still remained. Army attempt
did still fail. All ranges - Youth of ff. Classes also ages. ~~1939-45~~
Practice Act. People did as they were told ^{partly} for or fear. They came for
the Jews etc. Really failed due to weakness of opp.

It is often suggested that due to the success of the Nazi's
propaganda campaign under Goebbels, use of terror and violence and
consolidation of power that their popularity meant they faced
little opposition in the war years 1939-45. It is certainly clear
that in the war period they did everything in their power
to appease the population and even in war time
environment ensured for the first 3 years at least that
the German consumer did not suffer and that rationing
was not as severe as in Britain. They also appeased the
nation by, after fueling anti-Semitism through their hate
campaigns, ^{was seen to deal with the problem} placing restrictions on the Jews and eventually
in the extreme and horrific final solution exterminated vast
numbers of the Jewish population amongst other "undesirable"

(Section A continued) groups. Even with the numerous ways that the party tried to please the nation and raise support, also achieved on their ~~80~~ early successive and fulfillment of Liebknecht ^{or living} ~~and~~ space, there was significant opposition to the regime in this period although the seriousness of this opposition is often debated.

When Hitler came to power 30th January 1933 he quickly set about consolidating his power ^{something} which impacted the rate of opposition in this period dramatically. In March 1933, for instance, he passed the Malicious Practices Act which banned any form of negativity towards the party. This had a significant impact on the media and meant that any opposition the regime did face in 1939-45 was significantly limited ^{majorly} ~~seriously~~ reducing the seriousness of the opposition threat. In March Hitler also passed a range of other constitutions including the Enabling Act, banning the Reichstag, in April he banned Jews in the Civil Service, May shut down trade unions such as the ADGB who were attacked in their headquarters the day after their May day celebrations, ^{and} ~~and~~ in June he banned the SPD before making the Nazi Party the only legal political party in 1934. These actions are all relevant in limiting the ^{political} opposition that the Nazi Party faced in 1939-45 as it (forced groups) underground and in many ways made them more

(Section A continued) extremist and consequently a greater threat to the Nazi regime in 1939-45.

Some examples of the political opposition and their significance in 1939-45 are such left wing groups like the Red Poles and the

Jewish Communist Party who used violence to express their views. Whilst these underground parties often lacked unity in this period and were often infiltrated and shut down by the Gestapo they still remained even when banned capturing the passionate hatred for the regime as members were willing to risk death. The case of their violent tactics and perseverance certainly supports claims that opposition in this period was serious, however, the fact the left wing groups failed to work together with their right wing counterparts weakened their threat suggesting opposition to the Nazis in this period weren't serious.

It should be noted, however, that right wing political opposition groups like the Goebbels group and Kärner Circle whilst having opposing views and lack of unity often with each other did unite with the Army, another opposition force in this period, increasing their threat.

The right wing opposition groups are the



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Examiner Comments

This response demonstrates a good knowledge and understanding of the issue of opposition in the period 1939-45. However, the analytical focus is inconsistent, at times developing focused arguments and at other times describing events and issues. It also spends significant parts of the essay discussing issues that are outside of the date range in the question. Answers such as this usually achieve a level 3.



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Examiner Tip

Read the question very carefully, particularly considering the given date range, to ensure that the material you use relates fully to the question asked.

Question 3

Most candidates who attempted this question had a good understanding of the motivations behind appeasement, although there was variation in the range and depth of knowledge concerning relevant events. In general, candidates were stronger on the 1930s than the period 1925-29. The majority of candidates had a strong grasp of what Germany's grievances were and why these could be seen as legitimate, although a small minority did focus heavily on the terms of the Treaty of Versailles without fully linking this to the issue in debate. There was also largely solid coverage of Britain's military position and the public appetite for war, linking effectively to events such as the Fulham East by-election or the Oxford Union resolution. A small number of candidates did stray into accounts of Neville Chamberlain's motives during the events of 1938-9.

(Section A continued) Major conflicts for at least ten years. So if Britain had engaged in a war with Germany when Germany began to seem dangerous, they would be infringing the pact and it would not set a good example on the promises made by British governments.

During the period of the 1920's, Germany were also invited into the League of Nations, which shows an example of improving Anglo-German relations. In 1933 when Hitler was made Chancellor, he was more concerned about bringing Germany back to greatness, than improving on foreign relations. For example by 1935, Hitler had begun rearmament in Germany & introduced conscription which goes against the agreements of the Treaty of Versailles. Actions such as this show us the grievances felt which put in place the policy of appeasement. One example of Britain's appeasement can be seen mostly when Chamberlain won the general election in 1936, becoming the new British prime minister, succeeding Stanley Baldwin. In 1936 Chamberlain sent Lord Halifax to Germany in order to find out exactly what Hitler was doing & what he wanted, as a result of false British intelligence

(Section A continued) Murmours of his plans to invade Poland. Although sending Halifax over was an attempt to appease & negotiate with Hitler, it only caused more tension between Germany and England. Germany, in spite of the treaty of Versailles & Britain's prying eyes, signed an Anschluss with Austria. ~~their intention~~ was the formed Alliance with Germany & Austria was further proof of the ~~right~~ legitimate grievances Germany had, explaining why Britain went on to form the policy of appeasement.

In 1936 the Spanish Civil War began. Britain were holding a mostly pacifist attitude towards the conflicts, however Germany Hitler used the war as means for some practice into war fare, & the city town of Guernica was flattened by German Bombers. This demonstrates that Germany were ready for warfare, Britain could see Germany's military strength, which would have scared them into ~~thinking~~ wanting to be on good terms with Germany & impose appeasement.

In conclusion, although Britain were in no shape or form ready for a major conflict by 1937 & would also be infringing the ten year pact, Bri-

(Section A continued)

tain had little military allies after being on bad terms with Italy over the Abyssinian Conflict, the legitimate grievances felt in Germany did have a large part in Britain's policy of appeasement. As Germany was beginning to rearm & get involve in foreign conflicts, Britain could see Germany was becoming a world power that would suite better as an ally than to be the enemy and thus imposed appeasement to stay on good terms with Germany.



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Examiner Comments

This response has a generally good understanding of the possible motives for appeasement and is able to select appropriate examples using some specific own knowledge. However, at times it is descriptive, and the points that are made are not consistently developed. This achieved a level 3.



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Examiner Tip

Generally speaking, responses in the higher levels are clearly structured around arguments that focus directly on the key issues in the question. Knowledge of these is then used to explore the importance or nature of the points raised.

Question 4

This was the less popular of the two section A questions for this sub-option, although a majority of candidates answering this demonstrated good subject knowledge. Extensive coverage was offered on the North African campaign, with many candidates also being well informed regarding events in Italy; Malta, Greece and Crete were less frequently explored. Whatever material was drawn upon, most candidates were able to construct coherent and usually well argued responses with at least some degree of analysis on the extent to which these campaigns were a strategic mistake, weighing the commitment of resources against the wider context for Britain and the war generally. Thankfully only a very small number of candidates drifted into excessive asides about the merits and possibilities of the alternative of an earlier invasion of France, although some enthusiastic responses did display excellent knowledge over the above mentioned campaigns. Stronger responses often tended to have a good chronological grasp of the Second World War, and as such were able to carefully assess British commitments in the context of developments.

The Mediterranean strategy has always been regarded with some controversy, some historians arguing that it was a strategic mistake and British resources would have been better utilised elsewhere such as in the Atlantic, but ^{win} some historians depending Churchill, the main instigator of the Mediterranean campaign, suggesting that Churchill was right to commit huge amounts of resources to a strategy he believed would win the war. It will be argued that the Mediterranean strategy, including the North African campaign, ~~was~~ ~~not~~ whilst not always perfect or successful, was far from a strategic mistake.

Firstly, the reasons for a land based battle in North Africa were extremely valid, therefore showing it may well have been a strategic mistake not to enter North Africa - the Suez canal and Middle Eastern oil needed protection from Italian & German control, and by controlling North Africa Britain protected its interests, shipping and trade in the Mediterranean. Britain also needed to prove to the Soviet Union and the USA that it was still committed to a land based war, after the disasters at Dunkirk and in Norway in early ^{mid} 1940, Britain arguably had to fight somewhere, with Churchill really pushing North Africa and the Mediterranean. This was because he believed that an invasion of France would be rendered unnecessary if Allied forces could advance

(Section A continued) up the 'soft underbelly' of the Nazi regime and attack Germany from the south - through Italy. These reasons would then seem to suggest that however the Mediterranean campaign progressed, it was not a strategic mistake to begin with at least.

However many, particularly with hindsight but also the Americans and Soviets at the time, disagreed with Churchill's belief about Italy and believed Britain's resources would be better used elsewhere, namely the defeat of the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic because this would allow the build-up of American forces in readiness for a landing in France. At the Casablanca conference in 1943 Churchill struggled to convince Stalin and Roosevelt to push on with an invasion of Italy because the Battle of the Atlantic had been won in May 1943 and, it seemed, there was no need and no excuse for Churchill to continue with the Mediterranean campaign when the clear objective was Operation Overlord - a landing in France. This is the strongest argument that the continued Mediterranean campaign was a mistake of strategy as it has been argued that the war would have ended sooner had full attention been given to preparations for D-Day. ~~It~~

This argument is strengthened by the nature of the campaign in Italy, it took over a month to capture just Sicily, and over 40 000 Germans escaped across the Messina ~~strait~~ straits. The landings for the Americans at Salerno were then a disaster, meeting fierce German resistance and struggling to maintain a foothold on the beach. In addition, whilst some defenders of the Italian strategy claim it was a good practice of American and British co-operation, in fact the co-operation was virtually non-existent, the two commanders

(Section A continued) Patton and Montgomery did not get along and made everything a struggle. This is also where Churchill's strategy of the Italian soft underbelly is viciously attacked as the Allied forces became bogged down throughout 1943 and 1944. The mountain spine made German commander Kesselring's job of defence much easier and the defensive Gustav line held until mid-1944 when Monty Cassino finally fell. The weather was against the Allies and air cover was useless in the mountainous terrain, all leading to a conclusion that the Mediterranean campaign was a strategic mistake and a huge waste of Allied resources - the fact that General Clark captured Rome mere days before D-Day in June 1944 and ~~never~~ Italy was still being defended meant that it became a side-show, and according to some, a resource-wasting, costly side-show at that.

However these arguments fail to acknowledge the positive side of the North African and Mediterranean campaigns. Whilst the argument that Patton and Montgomery struggled to co-operate in Italy may be valid, in North Africa Anglo-American co-operation contributes to the argument that this strategy was not a strategic mistake. 1942's Operation Torch gave the Americans and British valuable practice at working together as a team, this can particularly be seen at the Kasserine Pass where American troops suffering fierce German resistance were aided by British tanks.

Operation Torch also gave valuable experience of amphibious landings, as did the Italian landings in Salerno and Anzio later on. Even if the landings were not completely successful the lessons

(Section A continued) learned were invaluable, such as the need for heavy air and naval support as shown by Salerno and the need to quickly breakout from the beachhead as shown by the 3 months entrapment on the beaches at Anzio through ~~March~~^{to} June 1944. These lessons were heavily utilised on D-Day, and arguably led to a more successful landing in France, showing that the commitment of resources here was just as strategically important as on D-Day.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the North African and Mediterranean campaigns however, was the drain on German resources. However much it is argued that our resources were wasted, the war of attrition that developed, particularly in Italy, was of a far greater disadvantage to Germany than to Britain and the allies. For example, almost all of Rommel's tanks, around 800, were destroyed in the Second Battle of El Alamein and when Rommel finally surrendered in May 1943 in Tunisia 250 000 Italians and Germans were taken prisoner. With the loss of a further 500 000 troops in Stalingrad in February 1943 these were men and resources Hitler could not afford. This argument is valid later for Italy also, as in June 1944 as many as 30 German divisions were tied up defending Italy when they were needed in the West and East. In effect, Hitler was from June 1944 fighting a 3 front war without the ally of Italy thanks to Churchill's campaign, clearly showing that commitment of a massive amount of British resources in the North Africa and Mediterranean campaigns was clearly not a strategic mistake.

In conclusion, although Stalin, Roosevelt and many historians since

(Section A continued) believed that the North African and Mediterranean campaigns were a resource-drain and a strategic mistake, it can be seen that Germany suffered much more than the Allies from a war in North Africa and Italy, and so although not for the reasons Churchill first envisioned, the strategy was not misguided or mistaken, but actually proved effective in a speedier defeat of the ~~to~~ Axis powers.



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Examiner Comments

This was a very strong response which achieved level 5. The response clearly focuses on the question, developing analysis with well chosen support from own knowledge. Issues are examined in depth, with balanced counter-arguments and emphasis of key points.



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Examiner Tip

Evaluation is crucial for level 5. This response reaches clear and reasoned judgements on individual points as it goes along, focusing back to answer the question with judgements that follow from the preceding analysis.

Question 5

This was a popular question which produced a range of response, including many at the higher levels. Candidates generally seemed secure on the Schlieffen Plan and the implications it held for war in Europe. In particular, Fischer's thesis was often brought in to further the debate within the sources. For a number of candidates though, there was a tendency to stray from the specific demands of the question and the given evidence, focusing more on own knowledge driven essays on what caused World War One. That said, many candidates offered sophisticated reasoning, such as exploring the issue of a 'general European war', making distinctions concerning the Schlieffen Plan and assumptions over German aggression and/or were able to evaluate the sources confidently, particularly Taylor's view within the wider context of issues such as imperialism and the decline of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires. Thus, whilst the majority of candidates demonstrated good knowledge of events, it was those who considered the extracts carefully and recognised the debate within who achieved the higher levels.

PLAN : Nature of the Schlieffen plan. Taylor → war by timetable, all had plans, Germany offensive plan.
Mantel : Germany protecting Austria. Grenville : Imperialism French support for Russia. Russian mobilisation made war inevitable.

⑤

The nature of the Schlieffen Plan is important in explaining why war broke out across Europe in 1914. Taylor explains this in Source 1 by saying that all countries had plans but crucially Germany's plan was an offensive one and so his war by timetable theory blames the nature of the Schlieffen Plan for war. Mantel admits that 'war plans are important' in Source 2 but he also highlights Germany's close relationship to Austria in explaining why it initiated the Schlieffen Plan. Grenville takes a different angle in Source 3 blaming the sense of imperialism growing in Europe but in particular bellicose attitudes from

(Section B continued) The French.

It is true that the nature of the Schlieffen Plan is important in explaining why war broke out in 1914. A. J. P. Taylor best sums this up by saying that 'the moment the Germans decided on mobilisation they decided on war.' However the reasons why Germany decided to mobilise are far more complex and when analysing these details it becomes clear that Germany was not solely responsible for causing war. However they were a major part of the July Crisis and led to war. Taylor goes further with his argument by saying that Germany plans (the Schlieffen Plan) 'actually laid down the first 40 days of the German invasion' which takes them deep into Belgium and France whereas other plans only 'brought troops to their barracks'. However Grenville disagrees with ~~his~~ ^{the} sentiment that other plans didn't mean war. He argues that ~~even~~ ^{the} Russian mobilisation 'made war inevitable'. This is where it is important to not realise that European politics are in such a fragile state that any one country mobilising, even if not necessarily attacking, meant war. This refers to the 'fatalism about the inevitability of war' in Source 3. Although it is true that



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Examiner Comments

This response has a good focus on the question and clearly identifies the views taken by the historians in the given sources. Own knowledge of relevant issues is integrated with the given evidence and the views in the sources are cross-referenced as part of the discussion.



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Examiner Tip

Even a brief plan like the one in this response can help identify the views in the sources and focus the answer towards a structured response.

Question 6

Most candidates attempting this question demonstrated a good knowledge of consent and terror in the period 1933-39 and were able to consider the issue of 'consensus dictatorship'. Where candidates did less well, this tended to be due to two main issues: (i) making sweeping assertions regarding terror, popularity and consent which lacked either detailed consideration of the given evidence or precision in the application of own knowledge, and/or (ii) offering responses which were more geared to the question of was Hitler master of the Third Reich, focusing on pre-prepared arguments, often around the structuralist/intentionalist debate with limited regard for the actual demands of the question. A small minority did also assume Volksgemeinschaft was intended to include all minority groups, essentially arguing Hitler failed to achieve consensus as such groups were excluded. Thankfully, the majority performed better, accessing the higher levels with arguments developing clear contrasts between the use of fear and consensus, often exploring the extent to which these worked in tandem.

(Section B continued) This collaboration of popular consensus, terror and propaganda allows a synthesis of tools Hitler was able to use in his dictatorship during the "peacetime years of National Socialist rule". The important factor Hitler was able to obtain was that in order to succeed in an authoritarian rule was the ability to prioritise what was important, in this instance popularity, by introducing popular policies that would bring comfort to those previously pressured by long term problems such as ~~the~~ "the economy improving" and "regaining pride" ~~was~~ communicated by Johnson. This applied comfort would then be manipulated by use of "controlled terror" ~~is~~ suggested by Fulbrook. The synthesis of terror and public consensus was, therefore, crucial

in, as Gellately says, "Hitler's hybrid form of Government" as the people would give Hitler already substantial support in his dictatorship which was then "controlled" by the terror state of the Gestapo and SS under ~~the~~ Himmler. To conclude, the notion brought

(Section B continued) forward by Fulbrook about the strength terror had behind Hitler's dictatorship is perfectly valid. However, when in terms of the initial consolidation and ultimate keeping of his power, Hitler knew that a "consensus dictatorship" was crucial. His popularity and widespread idolization meant he could manipulate legislations and introduce radical policies such as the TH programme and not ~~be~~ trigger a national upset threatening his leadership. To win the "hearts and the minds" of the people in Germany proved to be both beneficial and empowering for Hitler. Opposition remained in the minority and the national

Socialism had ~~not~~ ~~an~~ ~~extreme~~
~~can~~ been so deeply indoctrinated
that terror forces such as the
previously mentioned Night of the long
knives, were able to be looked
over by the public. A public who
"slept soundly, worked productively and
enjoyed their lives" thanks to Hitler and
his ~~and~~ greatly "consensus" based dictatorship.



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Examiner Comments

This was a thorough, focused and ranging answer. The response has a clear view of the arguments within the sources and is able to explore these in the light of knowledge and understanding about the historical controversy. These final pages illustrate a response which synthesises the arguments and issues to reach a strong evaluation taking account of the given views. The spelling of consensus is noted, although this was not of significant consequence to the overall answer.



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Examiner Tip

As well as identifying the main arguments in the sources, good responses also pick up on more subtle points. Two apparently contradictory or very similar views will often have aspects that in some way vary from the overall argument.

Question 7

Of the two questions within this sub-option, this was the most popular in terms of the number of candidates electing to answer it. Most candidates seemed confident in accessing the debate and as such were able to integrate their own knowledge to the differing views within the sources. Most candidates offered some balance, although many did seem to bring strong opinions concerning Chamberlain to the debate. Whilst there was some misunderstanding of aspects of the sources, such as the reference in source 9 to 'aiming to postpone it to allow Britain to gain strength' being taken out of context from the rest of the sentence, the majority of candidates were able to produce responses which made good use of the sources, cross-referencing their arguments and engage with the debate, reaching valid and varying conclusions.

~~Czech Crisis
↳ Munich Conference!~~

C - good!	C - bad!
7.	-
9.	-
8	8

~~Q~~

- ~~① Inevitability of War - S7 + 9 ✓~~
- ~~② 1938 Appeasement position - S7 + 9 ✓~~
- ~~③ Chamberlain's political strength - S7, 8 + 9 ✓~~
- ~~④ Chamberlain's political weaknesses - S8 + 9 ✓~~
- ~~⑤ Was Britain better prepared in 1938?~~
- ~~⑥~~

The fundamental question that must be asked of Chamberlain's aims during the 1938 Munich Conference is whether he believed war was inevitable or not. Graham Stewart in source 7 believes that his motivations remain unclear to this day: Stewart talks

(Section B continued) 'two camps' of historians who believe either that Chamberlain wished to prevent war permanently or simply until Britain was better prepared. Hurd, in Source 9, appears to ally himself with the ~~first~~^{second} 'camp', claiming that Chamberlain knew war was inevitable and "evil", aiming simply to allow Britain to gain more military strength before embarking on such an endeavour. This ~~view~~ interpretation of Chamberlain's aims is sympathetic and disagrees with the views of many of Chamberlain's contemporaries, who believed Chamberlain was simply bending over backwards to give Hitler what he wanted; today, however, many historians agree with the views of Stewart and Hurd and portray Chamberlain as a competent politician who recognised the need to ~~put~~ increase Britain's military strength, rather than a weakly politician who succumbed to aggressive demands. This view is supported by General Ironside in Stewart's judgement, further reiterating that Chamberlain's motivations when sacrificing Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference were primarily military - to prevent war for the time being.

Perhaps more importantly, Stewart and Hurd also both agree on the fact that Britain was not

(Section B continued) ready to go to war over the Czecho-Slovakian crisis in 1938, instead being better prepared militarily in 1939. The disarmament programmes of the 1920s, not least of which was the Ten Year Rule and the restrictive Washington Naval Agreement 1929, meant Britain's defences were inadequate for war in 1938; the Washington Naval Agreement's ban on capital ship building had weakened the superiority of the Navy and reduced defence spending, fanned by the damaging Wall Street Crash and depression, left a weakly-supplied army and an obsolete air force. Chamberlain had stepped-up Britain's rearmament process in 1937 with a radical Arms Programme, but the economy could not sustain such pressure and a balance of payments crisis ensued.* Thus, Chamberlain was fully aware of these weaknesses and was eager to avoid going to war over Czechoslovakia: as Stewart describes it, Chamberlain knew "war would very likely be a disaster, not just for the Czechs and British, but for western civilisation itself". With this in mind, it is clear that Chamberlain's aims were not simply to appease Hitler, but to allow Britain the time to reach a position whereby Germany could realistically be challenged and defeated. Hurd describes how the "year of peace" after the Munich Conference

(Section B continued) allowed the improvement of the Royal Air Force and the introduction of conscription, both of which were aligned with Chamberlain's aim to reach peak military production; with this aim, it was futile and unrealistic to militarily challenge Hitler's Czechoslovakian ambitions in 1938. Therefore, both Stewart and Hurd agree that Chamberlain was not bending to the will of Hitler, but was instead following a grander rearmament plan that necessitated the prevention of war until 1939 at the very earliest.

Furthermore, the political characteristics of Chamberlain must also be questioned: Stewart's description of Chamberlain as a 'shrewd politician' is reiterated by Hurd's judgement that Chamberlain had the ability to recognise the needs of war, and that Britain in 1938 could not meet those needs. RAC Parker takes a slightly different stance, however, stating that Hitler "had to put up with too much fuss and interference from Chamberlain" - this can be interpreted as agreeing with Stewart's judgement, in that Chamberlain was not being controlled by Hitler, but instead Hitler was being constrained by Chamberlain's political stance and actions. Many of Chamberlain's

(Section B continued) contemporaries described him as a man who was easy to respect, because of his old-fashioned sense of authority and leadership, and therefore not easily 'duped'. These descriptions/judgements of Chamberlain's character serve to make it appear that Chamberlain could not have been 'the dupe of Hitler'; his political awareness was too sophisticated to allow Hitler to gain the upper-hand.

However, there are also many historians, both contemporaries of Chamberlain and modern-day academics, who disagree and claim that the extraordinary nature of Hitler's leadership style forced Chamberlain into submission, leaving him eager to succumb to Germany's demands. Hitler's extraordinary style is hinted at by Parker in Source 8: after describing how Hitler perceived his personal failure, Parker then states that "His prestige swelled" indicating Hitler's manipulative abilities, both in terms of moulding public opinion and influencing other politicians, such

* (1/6 of the Arms Programme was met from exports, leading to a balance of payments deficit.)

(Section B continued) as Chamberlain. In addition, Hurd in Source 9 describes "the shadow of slaughter" that guided Chamberlain, suggesting that possibly Chamberlain was so scared of repeating the First World War that he would have agreed to any of Hitler's demands had they meant war was avoided. There have been many claims that Chamberlain's appeasement policies were illogical: perhaps the superior abilities of Hitler and the fear of war felt by Chamberlain serve to explain why, in the face of much political opposition, Churchill did not stand up for Czechoslovakia in 1938.

There have also been many claims that Britain was actually better-prepared for war in 1938 than in 1939, so the more logical plan of action would have been for Chamberlain to stand up for Czechoslovakia in 1938, not for Poland in 1939. It is true that delaying war meant more time to prepare, but the economic situation in Britain meant that relatively little could be done to speed up rearmament - progress was made, but at a slow pace. France already had a strong, enviable army and many historians ~~has~~ believe that the combined might of the French and British would have been able to defeat Germany.

(Section B continued) in 1938, rather than embarking on war in 1939 when the German army had increased in strength at a higher rate than the British and French. This claim contradicts Stewart's second 'camp' theory that Chamberlain postponed war so Britain could be in a "position of strength" in 1939, and lends weight to the idea that Chamberlain's aims were simply to appease Hitler rather than prevent war for war's sake. It remains unclear whether the military strength of Britain and France could have overrun Germany in 1938, but it is clear that Chamberlain did not weigh-up the advantages of a 1938 war, instead favouring a postponed war.

In conclusion, it is obvious that Chamberlain was a complex man who no historian will ever fully understand, but from the knowledge we do have and the insights into character provided by numerous primary sources it is easy to say that Chamberlain was not simply 'duped' by Hitler, despite his persuasive oratory skills, into succumbing to German desires. Chamberlain, as Stewart and Hurd agree, easily recognised the advantages of postponing war, driving him to 'abandon' *Geheulordakia* ~~sa~~ with the aim of speeding-up British rearmament. It remains unclear whether a war in 1938 would have been more successful than a war in 1939, but ultimately Chamberlain was 'shrewd'

(Section B continued) enough to recognise Britain's deficiencies before plunging head-first into an unwise conflict. Parker's judgement that Munich was a failure is a justifiable conclusion to make, but the insights into Chamberlain's policy aims are important.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This is a confident and focused answer which explores issues from the sources and applies own knowledge selectively. The answer is balanced, exploring issues in depth and offering consistent analysis and assessment of the given views. This achieved a level 5 for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

Whilst this is perhaps a more extended introduction than most people would write, it clearly sets out the position of the different authors from the sources, also demonstrating strong understanding of the historiographical debate.

Question 8

Fewer candidates opted to answer this question than question 7. Most responses were well structured and offered some level of development from the given sources. Candidates own knowledge and understanding varied more; most had some degree of understanding of relevant issues concerning the Beveridge Report and aspects of the Labour policies from 1945 under the umbrella of the welfare state. For many, the discriminating factor in performance was the degree to which they were able to examine the given evidence in context, with those who were able to examine the differing views in the context of Britain's experience during, after and at times before WWII often performing well. In general candidates were less secure in challenging the question than accepting the premise of expectation, with some less successful responses tending to describe the sources and at times offering limited specific own knowledge.

I completely agree with the idea that in 1945 there was expectation that the government would seek to improve society. Britain had been hugely affected by WW2, and was in a position perfect for social change - although people may have wanted things back as they were before the war, they understood that this was impossible, and so were prepared for government intervention in order to improve their lives and their society. The world of pre war Britain 'seemed to be dead' (source 10).

Throughout the war, people had put up with the government controlling many aspects of their lives, but, through this, their lives had been expanded, and horizons broadened. The strong class divide from pre war Britain had been strongly affected by the war, with rich and poor being made to work

(Section B continued) and sometimes ~~live~~ ^{live} side by side women had been urged into working for the war effort, and over 55% of the British public were either in uniform or helping the war effort in another way. Being involved in the war had changed many people's lives, and they felt it was right that when the war ended, the government would help improve their lives. However the majority of the public were aware this wouldn't be easy. They had spent the war being controlled in a range of ways - rationing, ID cards, high taxes - and knew that in order for things to ~~be~~ improve, the government would need to continue being very controlling. This is echoed in source 10 - 'the mood was for big government, digging deep into people's lives to improve them' - which seems to imply that people are eager for government control if it would improve their lives. Source 11 also seems to support this, quoting Attlee: 'the post war years will not be easy'.

Source 12 however, seems to disagree with this view, saying that many people were unaware of the social reforms that occurred during the year, and needed subsidies



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This response has a sound understanding of issues and some focus on the question. However, at times it tends to describe rather than argue and analyse, and the sources are often used just as sources of information to support points. As this has some analysis, it was marked at a level 3 for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

Try to clearly structure points around arguments and wherever possible, cross-reference the views of one source against another.

Paper Summary

A general summary of the areas for improvement in the approach to the Depth Study question and the Associated Historical Controversy question on Option D may prove of benefit to centres. Depth Study question candidates need to ensure that their subject knowledge conforms to the specification. Weaker responses usually lacked range and/or depth. Candidates should ensure they understand key concepts appropriate to the topics studied, as discussion of words and phrases from the question is a key part of higher level analysis. Candidates need to be more aware of the time frame attached to a question. Many lower scoring responses devoted much time and space to discussing the years before and after the period targeted by the question. In order to address the question effectively, candidates need to offer an analysis not a descriptive or chronological account, and so structured responses are vital for the higher levels. Associated Historical Controversy question candidates need to treat the sources as a package to facilitate cross-referencing and advance a convincing line of argument. Generally speaking, a source-by-source approach is less effective in examining the debate within and across the sources. Candidates need to integrate the source material and their own knowledge more effectively to substantiate a particular view. Weaker responses were frequently too reliant on the sources provided and little or no own knowledge was included. Candidates should avoid memorised 'perspective' essays and base their responses on the issues raised by the sources instead. The Associated Historical Controversy is an exercise in interpretation not historiography. Following the above, a confident understanding of the range of the debate on the set controversy is very useful in giving a framework with which to explore the evidence and views in the given sources. Again though, this does not necessarily have to be a case of naming individual or schools of historians. Candidates should not provide extensive and unnecessary accounts of the provenance of each source.

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